4 May 2007
Related:
cg-inside.htm + Inside Coast Guard Deepwater May 4, 2007
cg-unmet.htm + Coast Guard Unmet TEMPEST Requirements April 23, 2007
cg-ugly.htm + Ugly Questions for Coast Guard on TEMPEST April 22, 2007
cg-leakage2.htm + Michael DeKort on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 22, 2007
cg-leakage.htm + James Atkinson on Coast Guard TEMPEST Leakage April 21, 2007
cg-screwup.htm + Coast Guard Big Time Screw Up April 20, 2007
Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2007 01:39:56 -0400
To: John Young
From: "James M. Atkinson"
Subject: Full Transcripts
Do not be surprised if folks end up going to prison over what is in
this transcript, and senior Coast Guard folks find that now is a good
time to resign..
These ships were hemorrhaging secrets,
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOLDS A
HEARING ON THE COAST GUARD DEEPWATER PROGRAM
APRIL 18, 2007
SPEAKERS:
REP. JAMES L. OBERSTAR, D-MINN. CHAIRMAN
REP. NICK J. RAHALL II, D-W.VA.
REP. PETER A. DEFAZIO, D-ORE.
REP. JERRY F. COSTELLO, D-ILL.
DEL. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, D-D.C.
REP. JERROLD NADLER, D-N.Y.
REP. CORRINE BROWN, D-FLA.
REP. BOB FILNER, D-CALIF.
REP. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, D-TEXAS
REP. GENE TAYLOR, D-MISS.
REP. JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD, D-CALIF.
REP. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, D-MD.
REP. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, D-CALIF.
REP. LEONARD L. BOSWELL, D-IOWA
REP. TIM HOLDEN, D-PA.
REP. BRIAN BAIRD, D-WASH.
REP. RICK LARSEN, D-WASH.
REP. MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, D-MASS.
REP. JULIA CARSON, D-IND.
REP. TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, D-N.Y.
REP. MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, D-MAINE
REP. BRIAN HIGGINS, D-N.Y.
REP. RUSS CARNAHAN, D-MO.
REP. JOHN SALAZAR, D-COLO.
REP. GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, D-CALIF.
REP. DANIEL LIPINSKI, D-ILL.
REP. DORIS MATSUI, D-CALIF.
REP. NICK LAMPSON, D-TEXAS
REP. ZACK SPACE, D-OHIO
REP. MAZIE K. HIRONO, D-HAWAII
REP. BRUCE BRALEY, D-IOWA
REP. JASON ALTMIRE, D-PA.
REP. TIM WALZ, D-MINN.
REP. HEATH SHULER, D-N.C.
REP. MICHAEL ARCURI, D-N.Y.
REP. HARRY E. MITCHELL, D-ARIZ.
REP. CHRIS CARNEY, D-PA.
REP. JOHN HALL, D-N.Y.
REP. STEVEN L. KAGEN, D-WIS.
REP. STEVEN I. COHEN, D-TENN.
REP. JERRY MCNERNEY, D-CALIF.
REP. JOHN L. MICA, R-FLA. RANKING MEMBER
REP. DON YOUNG, R-ALASKA
REP. TOM PETRI, R-WIS.
REP. HOWARD COBLE, R-N.C.
REP. JOHN J. "JIMMY" DUNCAN JR., R-TENN.
REP. WAYNE T. GILCHREST, R-MD.
REP. VERNON J. EHLERS, R-MICH.
REP. STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, R-OHIO
REP. RICHARD H. BAKER, R-LA.
REP. FRANK A. LOBIONDO, R-N.J.
REP. JERRY MORAN, R-KAN.
REP. GARY G. MILLER, R-CALIF.
REP. ROBIN HAYES, R-N.C.
REP. HENRY E. BROWN JR., R-S.C.
REP. TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, R-ILL.
REP. TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, R-PA.
REP. SAM GRAVES, R-MO.
REP. BILL SHUSTER, R-PA.
REP. JOHN BOOZMAN, R-ARK.
REP. JIM GERLACH, R-PA.
REP. MARIO DIAZ-BALART, R-FLA.
REP. KENNY MARCHANT, R-TEXAS
REP. CHARLIE DENT, R-PA.
REP. TED POE, R-TEXAS
REP. DAVE REICHERT, R-WASH.
REP. CONNIE MACK, R-FLA.
REP. JOHN R. "RANDY" KUHL JR., R-N.Y.
REP. LYNN WESTMORELAND, R-GA.
REP. CHARLES BOUSTANY JR., R-LA.
REP. JEAN SCHMIDT, R-OHIO
REP. CANDICE S. MILLER, R-MICH.
REP. THELMA DRAKE, R-VA.
REP. MARY FALLIN, R-OKLA.
REP. VERN BUCHANAN, R-FLA.
WITNESSES:
MICHAEL DE KORT,
FORMER PROJECT MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST FOR 123 SYSTEMS,
LOCKHEED MARTIN
ROBERT BRADEN,
SENIOR TECHNICAL STAFF,
PROCESSOR AND SYSTEMS DESIGN,
LOCKHEED MARTIN
SCOTT SAMPSON,
SECTION CHIEF,
DEVELOPMENT SECTION OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD MAINTENANCE AND
LOGISTICS COMMAND ATLANTIC VESSEL SPECIFICATIONS BRANCH
JAMES ATKINSON,
PRESIDENT AND SENIOR ENGINEER,
GRANITE ISLAND GROUP
THOMAS RODGERS,
VICE PRESIDENT,
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS,
LOCKHEED MARTIN MARITIME SYSTEMS & SENSORS
BRUCE WINTERSTINE,
PRINCIPAL PROJECT ANALYST,
LOCKHEED MARTIN MARITIME SYSTEMS & SENSORS
MARYANNE LAVAN,
VICE PRESIDENT,
ETHICS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT,
LOCKHEED MARTIN
LEO MACKAY,
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER,
COAST GUARD SYSTEMS;
JAMES ANTON,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF ICGS
T.R. HAMBLIN,
VICE PRESIDENT,
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
BOLLINGER SHIPYARDS
MARC STANLEY,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
BOLLINGER SHIPYARDS
DEBU GHOSH,
NAVAL ARCHITECT AND BRANCH CHIEF,
COAST GUARD BOAT ENGINEERING BRANCH
JOE MICHEL,
ASSISTANT DEPUTY,
SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION,
COAST GUARD NATIONWIDE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
PROJECT
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHAD JACOBY,
PROGRAM MANAGER,
SCALEABLE COMPOSITE VESSEL PROTOTYPE PROGRAM IN THE SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CATHY MARTINDALE,
CONTRACTING OFFICE CHIEF,
COAST GUARD ENGINEERING AND LOGISTICS CENTER
REAR ADMIRAL GARY BLORE,
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
COAST GUARD INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM
VICE ADMIRAL PAUL SULLIVAN,
COMMANDER,
U.S. NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
[*]
OBERSTAR: We meet today in full committee to inquire into compliance of
the Coast Guard with the requirements of the Deepwater contract.
When I was elected to the chairmanship of the committee, I said at the
very outset that we would have a strong emphasis on oversight and
investigations into the programs within the jurisdiction of our
committee.
It has long been a role of this committee, going back to 1959, when the
special investigating committee in the Federal-Aid Highway Program was
established by then Speaker Rayburn, and my predecessor, John Blotnik,
whose portrait is over there in the corner, was designated chair of that
committee.
It was the very first deep investigative work of the House in the
post-World War II era that resulted in conversion of all state federal
highway programs from no internal audit and review procedures to every
state having internal audit, review and accountability for their federal
highway funds.
It also resulted in 36 people going to federal and state prison for
their illegal activities in misuse and abuse of public funds in the
Federal-Aid Highway Program.
The committee continued its work into other areas of jurisdiction of the
full committee doing enormous good service to the public. We continue
that work in the spirit of inquiring into the wise, best and most
effective use of public funds and ensuring that there is not a failure
on the part of federal agencies in carrying out their public trust.
Of all the issues that have come before our committee -- we've had a lot
since the beginning of this session of Congress -- the failures of the
Coast Guard Deepwater acquisition program are the most disturbing.
The Investigations and Oversight bipartisan staff has been conducting
in-depth investigations over the last three months on the conversion of
110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot boats, which is a 12 percent
extension, and to modernize their electronics in the new era of
security, and the new or the additional mission of the Coast Guard in
homeland security.
OBERSTAR: The investigation uncovered factors far more disturbing than
we anticipated at the outset or than other committees that have looked
into this have uncovered. Major problems in the program -- some of the
major problems -- have already been disclosed in hearings of other
committees and by news reports.
But four years after the Coast Guard began the Deepwater program to
replace or upgrade all of its ships, fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters, we know that eight of the 110-foot patrol boats have been
found unseaworthy and rendered essentially useless by poorly designed
hull extension.
It's already on public record that plans to produce a new class of
140-foot ships have been shelved after a new hull design was found to be
flawed. It's already been published that serious questions have been
raised about the structural integrity of the new National Security
Cutter, and whether it can be expected to meet its projected lifetime in
service.
There are problems that have increased the cost of the fleet renewal
program from $17 billion to more than $24 billion. We know that the
Coast Guard's ability to fulfill its mission has been compromised, that
critically needed assets are not going to be available, or certainly not
available in the timeframe within which the Coast Guard needs them.
The Coast Guard constantly has been forced to cut back on patrols. At
times, it's had to ignore tips from other federal agencies about drug
smugglers. We are concerned these difficulties will only grow and become
more acute in the years ahead as older vessels fail and replacements are
not available.
What we have learned in our investigation, though, is even more
disturbing: serious management failings, which are serious, internal to
the Coast Guard.
OBERSTAR: We're not going to pass final judgment on those charges or
allegations until we have had the response to the Coast Guard and its
contractors.
I should point out that the testimony we will hear today raises serious
problems that were known early in the program by the Coast Guard, and
that warnings delivered by very courageous persons involved in the
program in the earliest days were delivered, and many of the warnings
consciously rejected by various levels of Coast Guard management.
I commend those whom are witnesses here before us today, who have helped
us understanding what happened, and who have put their jobs, their
careers on the line in order to do the right thing and assure that the
truth is out, in particular Michael De Kort, Robert Braden, Scott
Sampson.
And Mr. Atkinson is not a Coast Guard employee, but he is a similarly
public spirited person who has prepared an extensive analysis of the
internal problems.
The Coast Guard has taken a lessons learned approach to the tragedies,
the failures that have occurred in the conversion programs, and we hope
that today's hearing will make a major contribution to improving,
changing, not only the way the Coast Guard does this, but the culture --
the very culture -- within the Coast Guard. Time will tell, but one
thing is certain: We're going to stay on top of it.
OBERSTAR: The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, the ranking
member, Mr. Mica.
MICA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I have some comments. I'm a little bit concerned.
This is the first of our investigative hearings. And going forward
today, with some terms, or under some terms that I thought were a little
bit different than what I had anticipated.
I do have some issues that I do want to raise. The committee is
continuing today in what I was led to believe was oversight of the Coast
Guard's very important Deepwater program.
Unfortunately, after reviewing the materials for this hearing, most of
what we're going to hear, or go through, in a series of panels, appears
to be matters that we have already reviewed. I guess some of it may be
redundant, because I've not only participated in at least two hearings
on this committee, but also Government Reform Committee on which I
serve, which has also looked into this. This is, I believe, the sixth
hearing -- this is the sixth hearing held this year. And number seven is
next week in the Senate.
I do want to say that I've been impressed with the conduct of the
chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Cummings and the ranking member, Mr.
LaTourette. They stated that they would continue to pursue this matter
and have subsequent testimony from the DHS I.G. and the General
Accountability Office just last month.
In the January hearing Mr. Cummings, chair of the subcommittee, and the
Commandant Allen agreed that there would be a hearing 120 days later in
which the Coast Guard would report also on changes in the program and
progress that has been made. And I think that's very important that we
review that.
MICA: I come from the state of Florida. We have these eight cutters that
are now, I'm told they've been brought up here to the northeast from
Florida. They're not usable. These cutters are critical to safety, to
national security, to questions of the problems we face on illegal
immigration.
Last week, we had I believe over 100 Haitians just come in in one batch.
And the warm weather hasn't started.
The Coast Guard has a mission dealing with the illegal narcotics, which
is critical. And I don't have those assets there, whether there are 40
of these cutters. These are eight. A large percentage of these cutters
are out of service.
And I know there are some plans in place. And it's critical that we have
-- that we deal with these issues I've mentioned, not to mention the
possibility of some change in the regime with Castro and critical needs
without the vessels in place.
So no one is more deeply troubled than I am about the problems
associated with the 110-foot cutters to 123-foot cutters, which was the
effort under way.
However, I'm afraid, again, that this hearing merely rehashes some of
the issues the I.G. has gone through and reviewed and testified about at
our Coast Guard budget hearing last week.
And I do have the questions that were raised -- I'd like to submit for
the record, and then the responses, which are some of the same questions
again today. I'd like to...
OBERSTAR: Without objection, they'll be included.
MICA: ... have that included. In addition, I must point out, again, this
is our first -- this is very important, that this is the first of our
investigative hearings.
And both Mr. Oberstar and I are committed to strong investigations and
oversight. We think that's an important part of our responsibility.
However, the minority was not included in the selection or the
interviewing of these witnesses. And given the traditional bipartisan
nature of the work on Coast Guard and maritime transportation, this
causes me great concern.
In government reform, for example, we don't interview a witness or
depose a witness without notification and the opportunity to have a
bipartisan participation.
That does concern me. And I hope that's not the way we proceed in the
future.
I also understand that one of today's witnesses, as staff has told me,
is being paid by the committee, the taxpayers, as a consultant. And I
think that's Mr. Atkinson. Is that correct?
OBERSTAR: Only his travel and expenses were covered...
MICA: So he is being paid...
OBERSTAR: ... as in the tradition of the committee.
MICA: Again, I am concerned about the selection of witnesses and,
particularly, those -- well, we're going to hear from a whistleblower,
and I think he has some important information to share with the
committee.
I'm not certain because, again, our staff was not permitted to interview
him at the same time that he was actually in position to be able to
comment on some of the issues related to certification, et cetera, that
he may be testifying on. So that raises questions.
Secondly, with Mr. Atkinson, I'm just totally at a loss of why he was
permitted to be a witness. Now, I did not see this until yesterday, and
staff provided me with this yesterday, but anyone can go on to
www.TSCM.com. That's his Web site.
In 15 years of having witnesses before numerous subcommittees, some of
which I chaired or participating on different committees, I never had a
witness who set forth a mission statement or qualifications as some --
let me read from his -- and you all pull this up and see it.
"I will not have anything to do" -- these are quotes from his Web site.
"I will not have anything to do with someone I know to be a criminal,
and if I seen the slightest reason to believe that they have a criminal
history, I will back away from them the second I find out about it. In
fact, not only will I start backing away from them, but they will hear
me reloading the shotgun as I do it."
Second paragraph: "If someone chooses to be an eavesdropper, I'll hunt
them to the ends of the earth. If they're a felon or a crook using
electronics in their work, I will relentlessly stalk them until they are
rendered impotent."
Third paragraph: "When the eavesdropper lies on his deathbed and the
Angel of Death comes to take him away, I want Death to be holding a scan
lock instead of a scythe. I want them constantly looking over their
shoulder and expecting TSCM specialists to pounce on them and start
beating them with a MLJD, let them fear black boxes and weird- looking
antennas. Let them eat Xanax by the handful and spend their days in
pain."
Four paragraph: "Let them be afraid, let them be very afraid, for I am
hunting them. I'm not hunting -- them, then -- someone who I trained
will be afraid of -- I perform bug sweeps like a contact sport. I don't
play fair."
I've never heard a witness give those kind of qualifications.
MICA: Again, the rest of it is troubling to me. The staff pointed this
out. So I do have concerns about the witnesses, and particularly that
witness.
The Deepwater program, as I said, is critically important, and we need
to have the best witnesses and access to the best information and
resources to make certain that we have enhanced vessels and aircraft in
place as quickly as possible, at the lowest cost to the taxpayer.
In January, Admiral Allen appeared before the committee and committed
himself and the Coast Guard to improving the oversight, which is very
important.
Finally, I do have concerns about two things.
One, it's also the custom that we investigate and then we make a
determination, and I'm prepared to do that and work with the chairman
and the ranking member for calling the Department of Justice to look, if
we find in this hearing or subsequent hearings criminal and civil
misconduct that warrants an investigation, not to announce that to the
media before we hold the hearing.
And then the second concern that I have is that the Coast Guard has now
made an announcement, prompted by some of these inquiries -- and I'm not
sure that it's the wisest announcement -- to go forward with in-house
actually control and management of these contracts, which I don't know
they have the capability of doing and which testimony we've heard
previously and in other committees indicated that their inability to
pay, their inability to retain personnel, attract personnel or put a
program like this into place for oversight, they don't have -- they may
not have that oversight capability or ability even to maintain that
capability.
So in the meantime I pledge to continue to work with the majority. This
is a very important issue. And I'm sorry that we did get off with some
unacceptable terms in both procedures and witnesses for this first
hearing.
Yield back.
OBERSTAR: I read the same comments on the Web site, and I took them in a
different vein.
But, Mr. Atkinson, after he's sworn in, will have an opportunity to
respond to the ranking member's comments.
OBERSTAR: As to witnesses, I directed the majority staff to share with
minority the names of witnesses. And they're free to call and inquire
and interrogate them as they wish. And they had all the names.
As for redundancy, I can't control what other committees do, I say to my
good friend. If they want to have hearings, that's their business. But
we're conducting our business.
We did have a preliminary hearing earlier this year on Deepwater. It set
the stage for what I felt was a necessary -- and what you and I both
discussed was a necessary, more intensive discussion and inquiry into
these matters.
As for the Justice Department, we make no judgment. Justice is
conducting its own inquiry into this matter. And after the conclusion of
our hearings, and in consultation with the ranking member, we will
decide what next steps to take.
The gentleman from Maryland, chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Cummings
-- at the outset I want to say has conducted a very thorough inquiry and
has given an enormous amount of his personal time and been actually on
board the defective vessels -- I recognize the gentleman for his
statement.
CUMMINGS: I want to thank the gentleman for moving.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Oberstar, for your dedication and effective
oversight and for convening this hearing today to continue requiring
accountability. And I emphasize accountability on the part of the Coast
Guard as well as its contractor, partner for implementation of the
Deepwater acquisition program.
I must say that as I listened to Mr. Mica, I think we have to very
careful that we don't assassinate witnesses before they even testify.
These witnesses come to us, some of them I'm sure with some fear. But
they have stepped forward bravely, and I am very, very familiar with
their testimony.
CUMMINGS: And I know that they have the concerns of the American people
and the Coast Guard and Coast Guard personnel, by the way, in mind.
Deepwater is a $24 billion -- and I emphasize "billion-dollar" --
procurement effort, through which the Coast Guard is acquiring 91
cutters, more than 100 small surface craft, and 244 new or converted
aircraft, including helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes.
Americans trust the Coast Guard to protect them from emerging threats
approaching our homeland from the sea, to rescue them when they are in
danger and to protect the natural resources of our marine environments.
That trust is well placed. However, Americans also need to know that
they can trust the Coast Guard's leaders to manage the taxpayers'
hard-earned dollars effectively and efficiently, and to provide the
tools that the men and women of the Coast Guard need to succeed.
Further, Americans need to know that, when a multibillion-dollar
contract is signed, the parties to that contract will accomplish its
objectives to the best of their abilities.
Our expectations for the Deepwater program are not unreasonable. We
expect it to produce boats that float, planes that fly, and information
technology systems that work, meaning that they allow us for
identification of threats in the maritime domain, while protecting
sensitive and classified communications and allowing effective control
of deployed assets.
What is remarkable and completely unacceptable is that a program costing
on the order $100 million, intended to upgrade 110-foot legacy cutters,
lengthen them to 123 feet, and extend their service lives, has produced
eight cracking hulks that are now tied up within a few miles of my house
in Baltimore, unable to return to service and waiting for the scrap
heap.
And guess who paid for them? The American people.
What is unconscionable is that the simple and straightforward
expectations of Congress, and more importantly, the American taxpayers,
have not been met because of a combination of poor oversight by the
United States Coast Guard and poor performance by two of the world's
largest defense contractors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.
I applaud the action taken yesterday by Admiral Thad Allen, the
commandant of the United States Coast Guard, to begin to right what has
become a floundering acquisitions effort, veering far, far off course.
I believe that this decisive leadership will put this program on a path
to success.
However, though the commandant has taken bold steps to bring the systems
integration functions back in-house, to rebid parts of the Deepwater
contract, and to ensure that assets are independently certified against
the highest industry standards, it is essential that we learn the
lessons of the past five years of Deepwater implementation, so that past
errors are never repeated.
I've said it before, and I'll say it again. This is the country that's
able to send folks to the moon. We ought to be able to build ships that
float.
Today, therefore, we examine the 123 program. We will take a close look
at all of the actions of the Coast Guard and its partner, the integrated
Coast Guard systems team, that contributed to the colossal failure of
the program.
We want to know why the Coast Guard and its partners went ahead with the
design to lengthen the 110-foot cutters, despite warnings from the
United States Navy that the hulls should have been strengthened before
they were lengthened, warnings based on the Navy's own experience
lengthening the 170-foot Cyclone-class ships to 179 feet.
CUMMINGS: We will also closely examine whether the equipment installed
inside the converted 123-foot boats met all contractual requirements and
was designed to ensure safety of the crews -- and I emphasize that,
safety of the crews.
We want to make sure that Coast Guard personnel are safe.
And so, further, we want to examine whether the C4ISR command-
and-control system was properly certified to ensure the protection of
national security data.
I applaud the willingness of the dedicated individuals who worked in
various capacities in the Deepwater program to come forward today to
share their concerns about what they experienced on that program and
about the actions taken by managers leaving the program.
The committee's investigation also received critical assistance from an
outside expert on TEMPEST process, who has dedicated countless hours of
his own personal time to analyzing TEMPEST certification process on the
123s.
I thank Michael DeKort, Robert Braden, Scott Sampson and James Atkinson
for their dedication to excellence. Our committee shares their
dedication.
Therefore, while we examine what must be done to ensure the success of
Deepwater, we also will be examining what must be done to build
acquisition systems and develop experienced management personnel within
the Coast Guard who can ensure that a single dollar is never, ever
wasted in the procurement of a ship or plane for the Coast Guard fleet.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
OBERSTAR: I thank the gentleman for his very strong statement and again
for his very diligent work.
And I recognize -- I yield now to the gentleman from Ohio, the ranking
member of the subcommittee, Mr. LaTourette.
LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll try and move along
expeditiously.
I want to thank you and Chairman Cummings for holding this hearing. And
I have to say that I come to this hearing with a deep concern over the
future success of the Deepwater program. As I indicated at the
subcommittee hearing in January, there is no more important issue facing
the Coast Guard now than the delays and setbacks that are jeopardizing
this program.
This hearing today is going to focus on the conversion of the 110-foot
patrol boat fleet. And I believe that we will examine and use this
hearing to examine the roots of the problems that resulted in this
failure and how the Coast Guard, I hope, will look -- how the Coast
Guard can apply the lessons learned to future acquisition projects.
The original Deepwater contract, which has now run a number of years,
established performance requirements for each asset and component
system. It appears that in too many cases the responsibilities to
oversee, test and certify construction and performance of these assets
and systems has been vested in the contractors and not the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard has addressed these issues under Commandant Allen's
direction, it was announced just yesterday. And I have confidence that
the Coast Guard will take a much more active role in reviewing and
ultimately approving or disapproving asset designs, performance, testing
and compliance with contract requirements.
While I appreciate the commandant's new directives and willingness to
address past problems, I remain concerned by the number and nature of
problems that seem to come to light every time this committee holds a
hearing.
LATOURETTE: It appears that there were several opportunities to make
significant changes to the design and the structure of the 123- foot
patrol boat hull, and that Coast Guard chose not to take those
corrective actions.
As a result, the Coast Guard took possession of eight vessels that can't
be used for any mission by the Coast Guard, and are now scheduled to be
scrapped.
The loss of these eight vessels and the impending delay in requiring
more capable vessels hurts the Coast Guard's ability to safeguard and
secure our nation's waters, and jeopardizes the safety of Coast
Guardsmen that serve aboard increasingly aged and deteriorating vessels.
I'm further concerned by the apparent lack of control procedures that
allow a contractor to install self-certified component systems that have
not been tested against industry or military standards.
The Coast Guard is responsible for ensuring that the assets and systems
that it accepts meet all terms and conditions of the contract and all
relevant performance specifications. Under the commandant's new
directions, the Coast Guard will take on additional responsibilities to
verify compliance.
I can't emphasize enough how critical these new responsibilities are for
the future of the service. The Deepwater program and the assets that
will be acquired under Deepwater are critical to the Coast Guard's
future mission success.
The men and the women of the Coast Guard carry out brave and selfless
service to our nation each and every day. And we need to make sure that
the Deepwater program is carried out in a way that the best, most
capable equipment is acquired to allow these Coast Guardsmen to carry
out their important missions.
I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today.
And, Mr. Chairman, on the way over from my last series of votes, I
mentioned some matters to subcommittee Chairman Cummings, and I'm not
going to bring those up at this moment. But they do relate to issues
that Mr. Mica was addressing, and I hope that we -- maybe the four of us
could have a conversation in the future about some of those things.
I thank you for your courtesy and yield back the balance of my time.
OBERSTAR: I thank the gentleman for his statement, for his ever
public-spirited concern about the work of this committee.
We have had some difficulties in proceeding with this hearing because we
requested on March 20 documents from the Coast Guard, did not get what
we were requesting until March -- not until April 6.
And not until subcommittee Chairman Cummings met with the commandant did
we get at 5 p.m. Friday, April 13 the full set of documents that we
requested much earlier.
That hampered and made difficult the task of saying -- structuring this
hearing and getting the information we needed. So there have been some
difficulties along the way. And we made our best effort to include the
Republican side in this process and gave to staff the names of witnesses
right at the outset, and how to contact them and invited the minority
staff to conduct their own individual inquiry.
(UNKNOWN): Will the chairman just yield for...
OBERSTAR: Yes.
(UNKNOWN): I think the chairman and the full committee knows that I --
there's no member of Congress that I have greater respect for, and even
affection for, than the chairman.
My invitation was that maybe, as we move forward, we can do a little bit
better in talking to each other.
OBERSTAR: We always can do better. And we will.
(UNKNOWN): Thank you.
OBERSTAR: Now I call -- I ask all witnesses to rise. Raise your right
hand.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you'll give before the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure is the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
OBERSTAR: Thank you.
Mr. De Kort, we'll begin with you, and welcome your statement. And,
again, I say that you have provided an enormous service to the public
and to the committee, and I think, in the long run, to the Coast Guard
by the work that you've done, so please proceed.
DE KORT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those comments.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee. I deeply
appreciate your taking the time to hear testimony on the C4ISR problems
relating to the Deepwater effort.
While I will be highlighting the C4ISR issues, I'm sure you realize that
they are only examples of the systemic engineering and management
problems associated with this effort. The problems I will be describing
are not simply mistakes; they were informed, deliberate acts. As I will
show, I have been trying to resolve these problems for almost four
years.
After not being able to convince every level of management of every
relevant organization in Lockheed Martin through to the CEO and Board of
Directors -- and I believe there's a timeline up that shows some of that
information -- as well as working with Integrated Coast Guard Systems, I
turned to the appropriate government agencies, public officials,
whistleblower organizations, and when all else failed, the Internet and
the press for help.
What needs to be understood here is that every one of these problems was
easily resolved with off-the-shelf products well before any of the
assets were delivered.
Additionally, as the contract mandates system commonality, every one of
these problems is a candidate for inclusion on every other maritime
asset that ICGS delivers for the lifetime of the contract. This plan, if
allowed to come to fruition, will literally cripple the entire maritime
fleet of the U.S. Coast Guard for decades.
Before delving into the issues, I would like to tell you a little bit
about my background. I was an electronics technician in the U.S. Navy
for six years. I specialized in communications systems. After my
enlistment ended, I spent a brief time in the private sector before I
joined the U.S. State Department as a communications engineer for
embassy and consular duties, as well as for the counterterrorism group.
After leaving that organization, I became a systems engineer in Lockheed
Martin. Through the years, I was promoted to project, program, and
engineering manager. During my last five years, I was a software project
manager for Aegis Baseline 6.3, the lead systems engineer of C4ISR for
the Deepwater effort and the software engineering manager for the NORAD
effort.
It is the period where I held the C4ISR lead systems engineer position
that is the focus of this testimony. At the point I joined the effort in
the summer of 2003, the final design review had been completed and most
of the equipment had been purchased for the first several boats.
In addition to creating a master schedule, I was tasked with identifying
the final, deliverable requirements and planning the integration of the
first boats. It was during this period that several critical safety and
security issues came to my attention.
The first problem was that we had purchased nonweatherproof radios for
the Short Range Prosecutors, or SRPs. The boats are small, open aircraft
that are constantly exposed to the environment. Upon first hearing about
this issue, I have to admit I found it too incredible to believe.
Who would put a nonweatherproof radio, the primary means of
communication for the crew, on a boat with no protection from the
elements? The individual who brought this to my attention strongly
suggesting that I look into it, no matter how incredible it sounded.
DE KORT: I called the supplier of the radio who informed me it was true.
We had purchased four radios for the first four SRPs and they were not
weather-proof.
As a matter of fact, the vendor asked me to not use the radios on any of
the SRPs, which would eventually total 91 in all.
Upon informing Lockheed management that the radios needed to be
replaced, I was told that there was a design of record. This meant the
customer had accepted our designs at the conclusion of the critical
design review and that we would make no changes that would cause cost or
schedule impacts.
As a matter of fact, we ordered five more radios after I went to
management about the problem in order to prepare for the next set of
boats we were contracted to modify.
I tried for several months to get the radios replaced. Just before
delivery of the first 123 and its associated SRP, the customer asked to
test the system. Coincidentally, it rained on test day. During the
testing, several radios shorted out.
It should be noted that had we not tested the boats in the rain on that
day we would have delivered that system and it would have failed the
very first time it was used.
After this, I was told we would go back to the radio that originally
came with the SRPs. I believe that this example, more than any other,
demonstrates the lengths the ICGS parties were willing to go to hold to
schedule and budget while sacrificing the safety and security of the
crew.
The next problem uncovered involved the video surveillance system. The
Coast Guard wanted a system that would permit watching the boats when in
a Coast Guard port without someone having to be physically on the boat.
Our solution was to provide a video surveillance system that had
significant blind spots, leaving the bridge -- or pilot house --
vulnerable to penetration.
The most frustrating part about this issue is that the simple purchase
and installation of a fifth camera would have resolved the problem. Bear
in mind, we knew about the need for the extra camera several months
before the first 123 was delivered.
Another problem we discovered involved low-smoke cables. There was a
requirement to install low-smoke cables so that in case of a fire flames
do not spread quickly, equipment is not overly exposed to corrosive
smoke, and the crew is not exposed to a large amount of toxic fumes.
In a recent report, the inspector general for Department of Homeland
Security confirmed that over 80 of these cables are the wrong type and
that waiver the Coast Guard gave to the contractor said it could avoid
having to provide these cables was invalid.
DE KORT: The next issue involved communications security and the
standards necessary to ensure those communications are safeguarded from
eavesdropping or inadvertent transmission of crosstalk.
These standards are known as TEMPESTs. We installed non-shielded cables,
101 in all, on all of the 123s, cables that did not meet standard
TEMPEST and safety and security requirements, as borne out by their
failing of the visual inspection which was carried out by the
appropriate test authority.
This situation could lead to serious compromise of secure communications
not only for the Coast Guard, but for the government or other government
organizations such as DOD, FBI and DEA.
I was informed that we had not included these cables in the design
because we had not bid the TEMPEST requirements. And as such, we decided
we did not have the money to include them.
The final significant problem was that of the survivability of the
external mounted equipment. I saved this one for last because of how
serious the repercussions are for the Coast Guard and nation.
The fact that the DHS I.G. agreed completely with my allegations
relative to this issue, the incredible position Lockheed Martin has
taken on this issue and the fact that the Coast Guard seems unwilling to
allow them to get away with it -- surely before the first 123 was
delivered, we finally received the environmental requirements.
During the late review of the requirements -- of the equipment for
compliance, well after the design, review and purchase of the equipment,
we found the very first item we looked into would not meet environmental
requirements. Given this failure, we feared the rest of the equipment
may not meet environmental requirements.
Let me state this in simple terms: This meant the Coast Guard ships that
utilized this equipment would not operate in conditions that could
include heavy rain, heavy seas, high winds and extreme temperatures.
When I brought this information to Lockheed management, they directed me
and my team to stop looking into whether or not the rest of the
equipment met requirements. This meant that all of the externally
mounted equipment being used for the critical communication, command and
control, and navigation systems might fail in harsh environments.
Since that time, we have learned through DHS I.G. report on the 123s
that 30 items on the 123s, and at least a dozen items installed on the
SRPs did not meet environmental requirements.
In addition to their technical and contractual findings, the I.G. also
made some of Lockheed Martin's responses on this issue known in that
report.
Incredibly, the I.G. states that Lockheed Martin incorrectly stated in
their self-certification documents that there were no applicable
requirements stipulating what the environmental requirements were in
regard to weather. And they actually stated that they viewed the
certification of those requirements as, and I'm quoting, "not really
beneficial."
In addition, the I.G. states that the Coast Guard did not know the boats
were noncompliant until July of 2005, one and a half years after the
first 123 was delivered. The report also states that none of these
problems were fixed, not on any of the delivered boats.
That, along with this issue, not being called out in the DD-250
acceptance documents, supports my supposition that Lockheed Martin
purposely withheld this information from the Coast Guard.
DE KORT: Finally, the I.G. states that Lockheed's position on them
passing the self-certification without testing these items was the right
thing to do because they thought the tests would be -- and I'm quoting
again -- "time consuming, expensive and of limited value."
Bear in mind that the contractors have stated time and time again in
front of this and other oversight committees that they do not practice
self-certification.
Where does the situation leave us?
Had the hulls not cracked or the cracks not appeared for some time, ICGS
would have delivered 49 123s and 91 SRPs with the problems I described.
In addition to that, the Deepwater project is a system of systems
effort. What this means is that the contractor is directed to deliver
solutions that would provide common equipment sets for all C4ISR
systems.
Said differently, all the equipment for like systems need to match
unless there's an overwhelming reason not to. This means that every
faulty system I've described here will be installed on every other
maritime asset delivered over the lifetime of the effort. This includes
the FRCs, the OPCs and the NSCs. If we don't stop this from happening, I
suggest we'll deliver assets with these and other problems.
I believe this could cripple the effectiveness of the Coast Guard and
their ability to perform their missions for decades to come.
How have the ICGS parties reacted to the totality of the allegations?
At first, Lockheed and the U.S. Coast Guard stated, as stated by the
ICGS organization responded to my allegations by saying they were
baseless, had no merit or that all of the issues were handled
contractually.
That evolved, after the I.G. report came out, to then stating that the
requirements had gray areas. And later, by actually deciding, after the
systems were accepted and the problems were found, that in some cases
the Coast Guard exaggerated their needs and it was their -- as was their
comment regarding the environmental survivability problems.
Up until the announcement yesterday, I have heard a lot of discussion
about the changing of the ICGS contract structure, the fixing of the
requirements, reorganizing the Coast Guard and adding more oversight.
While all of those things are beneficial, they in no way solve the root
problem. Had the ICGS organization listened to the Engineering Logistics
Center, or ELC, and my recommendations, there would be no problems on
these boats.
We wouldn't be talking about more oversight or making sweeping changes.
Instead, we would be discussing what a model program Deepwater is.
I guarantee you that had the changes that were made up until yesterday's
announcement been made four or five years ago, it wouldn't have
mattered. Even with the incestuous ICGS arrangement, the less-
than-perfect requirements and minimal oversight, there was plenty of
structure in place and information available to do the right thing.
It is not practical to think that one can provide an ironclad set of
requirements and associated contract that will avoid all problems. All
that was needed were leaders who were competent and ethical in any one
of the key contractor or Coast Guard positions. Any one of dozens of
people could have simply done the right thing in this effort and changed
the course of events that have followed.
It is because of that that I strongly suggest you shift -- suggest your
focus shift to one of accountability in an effort to provide a
deterrent.
DE KORT: No matter what structure these parties put in place, no matter
what spin they come up with, promises they make, no matter how many
people you spend taxpayer dollars to employ to provide more oversight,
it still comes down to people.
We wouldn't need more oversight if the ICGS parties would have done as
they promised when they bid the effort.
They told the Coast Guard, we know you have a lack of personnel with the
right skills; let us help you; let us be your trusted agent; let us help
write the requirements so we can provide you cutting-edge solutions; let
us write the test procedures and self-certify so we can meet the
challenges we all face in the post-9/11 world.
In the end, people have to do the right thing, and know that, when they
don't, the consequences will be swift and appropriate. I strongly
believe that, especially in a time of war, the conduct of these
organizations has been appalling.
As such, I would hope that this committee and other relevant agencies
with jurisdiction will do the right thing and hold people in these
organizations accountable.
All defense contractors and employees of the government need to know
that high ethical standards are not matters of convenience.
If you do not hold these people and organizations accountable, you will
simply be repackaging the same problems and have no way of ensuring the
problems don't happen again on this or any other effort.
In closing, I am offering to help, in any way I can, to remedy these
issues. As I told Commandant Allen's staff and Lockheed Martin, before
my employment was terminated, I want to be part of the fix.
With the right people in place and the right positions, this project can
be put back on track rapidly.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and look
forward to answering your questions.
OBERSTAR: Thank you very much for a very thorough, thoughtful and
well-structured statement.
Mr. Braden, would you identify yourself and then proceed with your
statement?
BRADEN: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My
name is Robert Braden, and I have over 40 years of engineering
experience, including nearly 30 years of service with Lockheed Martin
Corporation.
I'm currently employed by Lockheed as a senior technical staff at
Morristown, New Jersey. In this position, I'm often expected to provide
program and project leadership for a variety of programs.
In early 2003, I was requested to join the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater
program as a lead system engineer for the communication area master
stations, or CAMS, and legacy cutter program.
That program was to do upgrades of three different classes of cutters
that were -- did not include the 123s.
Program objectives were to provide enhanced satellite communications and
modern C4ISR systems for these existing legacy assets.
This included installations, upgrades, and new capabilities for 39
existing legacy cutters. We provided significantly improved satellite
bandwidth, improved shipboard networks, new (inaudible) radios, new
automatic identification systems, and expanded secret Internet protocol
router networks, or SIPRNet communications capabilities.
These improved SIPRNet capabilities provide the legacy fleet with the
ability to significantly improve coordination of law enforcement and
homeland security actions with the U.S. Navy and within the Coast Guard.
After completing the total re-plan of the program, we submitted an
aggressive fixed-price proposal to the Coast Guard. Unfortunately, the
Coast Guard contracting office continued to extend negotiations all the
way to the end of the fiscal year.
This required Lockheed Martin to either stop work or independently fund
the continued engineering and procurement of our long-lead material.
Lockheed elected to support the aggressive Deepwater deployment
objectives of Admiral Stillman, and provided several million dollars of
internal risk funding to allow my team to obtain the material, integrate
the system and prepare for the first installations.
BRADEN: During this same period of development and design, I was engaged
in intensive dialogue with my Coast Guard contracts technical
representative, with the Coast Guard ships integration personnel, and
with the Coast Guard's Telecommunication Security Organization, known as
TISCOM.
The purpose was to determine and negotiate all requirements for the cams
(ph) legacy installations. Our key objective was to provide a
communication installation that would immediately achieve a SIPRNet
interim authority to operate, followed shortly thereafter by a full
authority to operate. And the reason that was important is these ships
were in port for a limited period of time. When those ships left port,
our installation needed to allow the crew to immediately use the new
secure capabilities.
I was also fully engaged in weekly program integration meetings
involving all Morristown management of the Deepwater program. These pit
meetings were mandatory every week and covered all aspects of the
program and included at every meeting U.S. Coast Guard representatives;
generally included representatives from the ICGS or Integrated Coast
Guard Systems organizations.
The purpose of the meetings were to ensure coordination among the
various programs and maintain commonality among all the assets. Topics
included status of the system-of-systems activities, the cams (ph)
legacy cutter upgrades, the 123 foot cutter conversion program, and the
other various assets.
Approximately once each month, the PIT meetings, Program Integration
Team meetings, would expand to a full Deepwater program review with all
management present, and that usually included the ICGS, the different
subcontractors, as well as the Coast Guard officers.
On numerous occasions I presented the design, installation and security
briefings appropriate to my cutter class to ensure coordination of our
cams (ph) and legacy plans.
During these PIT meetings, the various LSEs, or lead system engineers,
would become aware of the problems and issues faced by their
counterparts. So part of the purpose of the meeting was to make sure we
compared notes and made sure that we all met a common design.
We would occasionally compare notes to see if a common resolution to our
problems were possible. Often, the aggressive pace of my own project and
the structure of the Deepwater program required that my team maintain
focus on our own design issues.
However, whenever I found an issue that concerned me and I was unable to
influence a change, I would advise upper management of the problem.
In August 2003, my team began upgrades of the cams (ph) (inaudible) or
the Master Station Atlantic facility, an installation of the first
Deepwater sea-based asset, the U.S. Coast Guard Northland. We completed
these installations within one month, thereby establishing the milestone
of the first successful asset delivery to the Coast Guard Deepwater
progwram.
BRADEN: And by year end, we followed this achievement with the
successful installation of the Deepwater C4ISR suite aboard the Cutter
Tampa. The subsequent string of successful installations has been a
continuing source of personal satisfaction for my design and
installation team. I personally take great pride in expeditiously and
cost-effectively completing the first successful and compliant Deepwater
installations in the history of the program.
I continue to manage and guide the installation of the first nine
270-foot legacy cutters, and develop the design and installation
procedures for the remaining 210- and 378-foot cutters. In March 2004, I
was removed from the Deepwater program and transferred to another
program.
This concludes my testimony. I'd be please to answer any questions the
committee may have.
OBERSTAR: Thank you, Mr. Braden.
Mr. Sampson, please identify yourself and proceed to your testimony.
SAMPSON: Good afternoon, Congressman Oberstar, Congressman Cummings and
distinguished committee and subcommittee members. My name is Scott
Sampson. I have been requested to come before you today to discuss my
involvement with the 123 Program as associated with the Deepwater
program.
I have a unique perspective of this program in that I work for the DOD
agency which expressed grave concern about a potential extension of a
110-foot patrol boat to 123 feet, and then changed jobs to work for a
Coast Guard office which supports these modified cutters.
Today, I will tell you about the people I communicated my concerns to
that were, unfortunately, realized.
If I may request, Mr. Chairman, I would like my written statement
entered into the record.
OBERSTAR: Without objection, so ordered. Your statement will be included
in the record.
SAMPSON: Thank you, sir.
The DOD agency I worked for was the Combatant Craft Division, a
detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division,
otherwise known as CCD. CCD had designed a similar extension on a
similar platform and felt, based on lessons learned, that the proposed
method of modification of the 110 was at a high risk for failure.
While I was with CCD, three key contacts were made to express concerns
over the proposed design modification. The first was Debu Ghosh of the
Coast Guard's Engineering Logistics Center. Mr. Ghosh was the branch
chief of the Boat Engineering Branch. Second, was Diane Burton of the
Coast Guard's Deepwater program office. Ms. Burton is the Deepwater
surface technical director. The third person that was contacted was
Dennis Fanguy of Bollinger Shipyard. Mr. Fanguy was the head of their
engineering department.
These conversations were conducted in the August to September 2002
timeframe, with the exception of Mr. Fanguy who was contacted shortly
thereafter.
It was explained to each of these individuals not only concerns
associated with a proposed modification of the 110, but where those
concerns stemmed from as they pertained to a similar experience with a
Navy craft. These concerns centered around several items, but
specifically included longitudinal strength, running trim and
engineering experience.
Mr. Ghosh appeared to share our concerns and attempted to hire combatant
craft to assist with oversight. Specifically, Mr. Ghosh requested, and I
provided, a statement of work and an estimate to provide 14 days on
onsite support at Bollinger Shipyards consisting of two naval
architects, and also to provide an seakeeping analysis comparing the 110
to the 123.
SAMPSON: The estimate for this level of support was $42,000.
Mr. Ghosh told me shortly thereafter that the Deepwater program office
would not supply the funding. Conversations with the other two contacts,
Ms. Burton and Mr. Fungeye (ph), were short with little discussion.
Matagorda was inducted into Bollinger shipyard on the 2nd of February,
2003. On the 5th of March, 2004, the Matagorda was delivered back to the
Coast Guard, and on 10th of May, 2004, entered a post-delivery
maintenance availability.
Within days of leaving this availability, in early part of September
2004, Matagorda suffered damage in the middle of the cutter, buckling
the side shell and deck.
This is the type of longitudinal failure that the combatant craft
division anticipated seeing, and had warned the Coast Guard and
Bollinger shipyard about.
This predicted failure occurred not as a result of fatigue or corrosion,
but rather from one short period of operation in a sea reported to be
four to six feet in height.
This longitudinal (inaudible) failure was acknowledged in a report
issued by ELC entitled, "Matagorda Buckling Incident Analysis," dated 24
September, 2004, and verified our concerns expressed in August of 2002.
After two attempts to make the 123s usable for service, the Coast Guard
made the decision to lay the vessels up until a final decision could be
made as to whether or not they could be repaired.
The Coast Guard made this decision after extensive inspection of the
cutters. All eight cutters are currently located at the Coast Guard
yard.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my own statement. I'll be more than happy
to answer any questions you may have.
OBERSTAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Sampson. That's very critical
testimony for the inquiry of the committee.
I've heard a couple of cell phones or other devices going off. Under the
committee rules, all communication devices must be inaudible. Turn them
off, or put them on vibrate.
Mr. Atkinson -- and you may feel free in your remarks to respond to the
issues raised by Mr. Mica earlier.
ATKINSON: Thank you, sir.
My name is James Atkinson. I'm the president and senior engineer of
Granite Island Group, located in Gloucester, Massachusetts.
We specialize in electronics engineering. We perform bug sweeps. We
perform wiretap detection. We stop technical espionage. We plug leaks,
both in classified and in unclassified communication systems.
Essentially, we hunt spies.
I am considered to be one of the top international experts on the
subject matter of TSCM TEMPEST, and technical security.
I have attended private and government-sponsored TSCM TEMPEST,
cryptographic technical intelligence, electronics and security training
both in the United States and abroad. I have been involved in many
hundreds of TSCM TEMPEST inspections over the last 25 years of
government service and private sector assignments.
My clients include the major -- heads of the major corporations, heads
of state, diplomats, government agencies, defense contractors,
hospitals, courthouses, political leaders, ministers, small businesses,
large ministers and virtually every walk of our country.
Due to the nature of my -- of the services I render to my clients, it
would not be prudent to disclose precisely who they are. However, I've
been to Washington, D.C. many times on business to render such services.
I am one of the few people who can clearly explain the highly technical
and highly classified subject matters such as TEMPEST and TSCM to this
committee in an unclassified way, so that a non-technical layman can
understand it. And I can provide a voice of reason.
ATKINSON: The documents in this matter are highly technical, and it
takes a TEMPEST and TSCM expert to fully understand what is really in
those documents, what it really represents, and what they really mean,
and to bring forth the gravity of what is really going on.
The core message here is that TEMPEST is a rigorous series of government
standards which have been developed by the National Security Agency. The
purpose is to protect classified equipment, signals and information from
eavesdropping.
TEMPEST focuses on securing classified equipment and systems in order to
keep electronics from leaking secrets. Our foreign adversaries know
about TEMPEST and a related field and know how to steal our electronic
secrets from equipment that does not comply with these rigorous
standards.
For example, the nations of Cuba, Iran, India, China, Colombia, France,
North Korea and many other countries have become quite adept in
eavesdropping on our improperly protected classified equipment.
While most countries are our allies, the United States has designated
over 30 nations to be openly hostile to the United States. And there is
strong evidence that these countries not only do have the equipment to
eavesdrop on our leaking equipment, but do so on a regular basis.
Gentlemen, it's my unpleasant duty to inform you that the Coast Guard,
ICGS and Lockheed Martin have been highly negligent in their oversight
of the Deepwater program, that many millions of dollars has been wasted
on ships that don't float and classified electronics which leak national
security secrets.
During my review of the technical documents in this matter, I discovered
that the United States Coast Guard was not being forthcoming with
information to this committee and that the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General had previously requested in regard
to C4ISR and TEMPEST issues.
I found that instead they were hiding malfeasance within these documents
and a deeply flawed procurement process.
Further review determined that there was significant lack of oversight
on the part of the United States Coast Guard and that they were using
doublespeak in their answers to this committee and evading politically
uncomfortable questions put before them.
Based on the analysis of the numerous documents, to include detailed
TEMPEST reports, which the Coast Guard eventually, albeit begrudgingly,
provided to the committee, I was able to determine the following: From
the very beginning, the very first day of the program, the Coast Guard
did not clearly define the technical specifications and standards that
these ships had to comply with in order to protect classified
information.
The contractor, in turn, delivered substandard and highly defective
assets, as there was little or no Coast Guard oversight on the project,
even though the government was paying the contractor to provide
oversight as the integrator.
The Coast Guard accepted delivery of these defective ships, and instead
of correcting many of defects, merely covered them up with waivers or
used substandard parts to create the illusion of a repair.
ATKINSON: An example is unclassified and classified local area network
connection boxes were supposed to be separated from each other. The
Coast Guard chose to resolve this problem merely by putting stickers on
the equipment, as opposed to fixing it. So they patched the leak with a
Post-it note.
Not only has the contractor responsible for this waste butchered eight
valuable ships and rendered them worthless, they have then endangered
national security in delivering ships that leak secrets, contain
significant vulnerabilities and which provide a clear and present danger
to our national security.
The Coast Guard was, and still is, spending money like a drunken sailor
on shore leave with minimal oversight. The Coast Guard lacks the core
competencies and resources to protect this classified information
through their TEMPEST program. ICGS has taken advantage of the United
States after 9/11, and has taken advantage of the Coast Guard in
particular. The Coast Guard put more priority on its public relations
program than it did with her TEMPEST program.
My recommendations is that the -- this committee pull the plug on the
Coast Guard's access to classified information, that it revoke SIPRNet
access and essentially revoke the Coast Guard's security clearance. This
should be done by the end of business today.
Also, I recommend that you initiate an exhaustive, top-down study of all
COMSEC -- Coast Guard COMSEC, TEMPEST, non-stop, TSCM, emissions
security and related technical security and engineering disciplines, and
focus on all assets of the Coast Guard, not just the Deepwater ships.
I recommend that this committee assume that every Coast
Guard asset is
suspect until it can be scientifically proven secure through actual
instrumented analysis, and not just waivered as has been the case of
late.
I recommend that all eight cutters be stripped of anything of value, and
that they be sold off as scrap metal.
Cancel or suspend all current and upcoming contracts with ICGS and
Lockheed Martin until this matter can be fully resolved. And consider
issuing an interim debarment against Lockheed Martin and ICGS until
their full management has been forthcoming with appropriate answers.
Also, refuse to allow the Coast Guard to possess, access, obtain
materials or gain access to any classified networks until each asset has
been subjected to a rigorous and independent, highly detailed technical
inspection by somebody outside of the Coast Guard.
Refuse to allow the Coast Guard to purchase any further tactical or
deepwater assets unless other elements of United States government
provide very close oversight of the specifications, designs and
procurement of such systems.
The natural agency to assist the Coast Guard with this would be the U.S.
Navy, who should handle the procurement and oversight of the Coast Guard
assets until such time the Coast Guard is competent and can be trusted
to do this themselves, which they have not been able to of late.
Identify the top command-level officers within the Coast Guard who had
the ultimate responsibility for the oversight of this program, and then
remove them from any further government service.
Finally, we have to assume that Department of Homeland Security is not
competent in these matters, and that their lack of oversight is
widespread and institutionalized.
Patrick Henry stated years ago that we are apt to shut our eyes against
a painful truth. But from my part, I am willing to know the whole truth,
to know the worst of it and to provide for it.
Gentlemen, the project was doomed to fail at the very beginning. When
modern electronics operate, they generate electromagnetic fields.
Digital computers, radios, typewriters and so on generate tremendous
amounts of electromagnetic energy.
Compromising the emanations is that electromagnetic energy. This can be
conducted through the airwaves, over the power lines, over the phone
lines, cable TV. The TEMPEST standards are very rigid as to how these
emanations are controlled.
The Coast Guard completely disregarded all of the specifications except
one, and the one which they chose to pay attention to, they evaded on it
significantly.
Most consumer market equipment leaks significantly. However, if
somebody's computer leaked a little bit of information, they may have
personal embarrassment. If a national security cutter, or a Coast Guard
cutter, or a B-2 bomber or other tactical equipment leaks, national
security is at risk.
This project was doomed to failure. It boils down to two core issues: a
lack of oversight and malfeasance.
On the issue of my mission statement -- my mission statement was
actually published many years ago. It says that I hunt spies and I hunt
bad people. That's what it says.
Lockheed Martin has a real problem with this because that issue was
brought up repeatedly by Lockheed Martin previously after their security
people were caught dealing with convicted felons to purchase illegal
bugging equipment and to do moonlighting.
ATKINSON: This issue was brought up my Lockheed Martin and provided to
the Coast Guard. I have a full audit trail from my Web site logs of them
doing this. That concludes my...
OBERSTAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Atkinson.
Mr. Atkinson has used -- and throughout the testimony, we hear -- the
acronym TEMPEST, which stands for telecommunications electronics
material protected from emanating spurious transmissions. A layman's
definition might be unclassified signals that leak from improperly
shielded cables.
You can go to RadioShack and buy a device that can tap into a modem that
is not properly shielded and get fax information and get computer
information from your neighbor's home, if you wish to do that.
The NATO electronic spies in Germany in the 1950s discovered that they
could break into classified information by using unclassified signals
that allowed them to trace back and into the heart of the technology in
use, and that is why the issue of TEMPEST is so critically important
here.
And we'll come to that later. We have a series of four votes on the
floor. We have eight minutes remaining on the first vote. We will recess
for the four votes, resume immediately thereafter with Mr. Cummings and
the chair. The Committee stands in recess.
(RECESS)
CUMMINGS: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to resume the hearing. We
left off with Mr. Atkinson to finish his testimony. And I want to thank
our panelists for your remarks.
CUMMINGS: I'm going to start off with a few questions.
Mr. De Kort, you mention in your testimony that you brought a number of
matters to the attention of senior Lockheed management. How high did you
take these issues and what responses did you receive?
DE KORT: I took the matters to the CEO, Robert Stevens, on at least two
occasions, and the board of directors. And the response I received was
that the allegations were baseless or had no merit, and I believe that
was based on Lockheed's contention that they had disclosed all the
issues to the Coast Guard or resolved them, and they were handled
contractually.
CUMMINGS: Now, did you ever contact the Coast Guard directly?
DE KORT: Yes.
CUMMINGS: And since you did that, who did you contact?
DE KORT: I contacted a Commander Ciampaglio and Mr. Jacoby, who's here.
I contacted Lieutenant Commander Derr (ph), who was, I believe, on the
commandant's staff at the time. I contacted the group commander of the
boats in Key West. And I think that's it.
CUMMINGS: And what kind of responses did you receive?
DE KORT: Well, "Thank you," was the response I got.
CUMMINGS: "Thank you"?
DE KORT: Yes. "We're look into it."
CUMMINGS: "But no thank you"?
DE KORT: They didn't say the, "No, thank you," part, but I understand
your point.
CUMMINGS: As a Lockheed employee, had you ever been involved in another
Lockheed project in which the company failed to meet contractual
requirements in the way that you describe on the Deepwater program?
Had you worked on any other contracts?
DE KORT: Not of the same type or scale, no, sir.
CUMMINGS: OK.
What was your role in the installation of the TEMPEST hardware in the
123s?
DE KORT: I was the lead system engineer for the 123s for C4SR, which
meant that the final design, the installation, was my responsibility,
and basically the final design.
Like I'd explained in my statement, I came on board after the final
design review, so everything was pretty much locked in concrete at that
point. And they had ordered all the materials.
The reason why the requirements were brought back up is because, as I
understand it, after the RAND study the Coast Guard asserted a more
aggressive posture in rolling out the programs, because the RAND study
had said, you know, if you want 100 percent mission satisfaction, you
have to pull back your schedule five or 10 years -- and they had
actually recommended 10.
DE KORT: And I believe that was what precipitated us rolling out the
123s differently than was originally proposed.
Originally, there was something called an increment 1. Increment 1 was
their first set of requirements. When I took over the system engineer
role, they decided to deliver an increment 0, which was a subset of
increment 1.
So we were trying to decide: What would that subset be and what were the
requirements associated with it? Did we deliver them entirely, not at
all, partially? So we -- part of my job was to figure out what increment
0 was.
And then, as I was figuring out what increment 0 was, I was asking,
well, then, what is our implementation? What is it we're doing to
resolve that requirement? And where are we in going down that road?
CUMMINGS: Did you all ever come to any conclusions as to what would be
the standard?
You just talked about the conversations that you may have had. And I'm
trying to determine whether or not there was clarity at some point with
regard to what those standards would be.
DE KORT: Well, there was basically, from the very beginning, sir, a
difference of opinion. When these issues were brought forward, the
response was -- and it occurred over and over again -- we have a design
of record.
And what that meant is we don't want to hear it. If what you're bringing
to me is that -- an issue that's going to cause any schedule or
financial problems or cost problems, we're not going to change it; we're
not going to do anything.
CUMMINGS: And I take it you had some concerns about the way things were
proceeding. Is that correct?
DE KORT: Oh, yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: And what were your major concerns or fears?
DE KORT: Well, individually, I think the issues are pretty severe. I
mean, it's the Coast Guard. So if you're putting equipment on Coast
Guard vessels -- and I'm talking about every Coast Guard vessel for the
next 20 years, everything that Deepwater does -- that won't survive the
elements,
OK, that's bad enough.
That you can't use their classified systems without compromising and
have somebody eavesdropping.
You have low smoke cables that if, you know, if they catch on fire, you
know, could cause someone to be overcome with smoke or make the fire
spread faster.
The blind spots on their surveillance system. I mean, the blind spots
were very, very large, and they led right up to the bridge.
So, individually, some of those issues are pretty significant.
In total, I don't think it's an overstatement to say that if they
continued, it would have crippled the Coast Guard.
Had these boats not cracked or had they not cracked for some period of
time, all 49 boats would have been delivered with these issues.
CUMMINGS: The ICGS team produced a document called "Evaluation of
TEMPEST Requirements to be followed aboard the Deepwater 123 (inaudible)
Class patrol boat." And it was authored by a Joe Agat (ph). Are you
familiar with that document?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: And it was dated February 20th, 2003. Is that correct?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: To your knowledge, were the procedures for installing the
TEMPEST hardware spelled out in this guide followed during the
installation of the C4ISR hardware on the 123s?
DE KORT: No, sir, the majority were not followed.
CUMMINGS: And was that book, this document -- I guess this was like the
Bible as far as the guide that's concerned, is that right, as to what
you're supposed to be doing?
DE KORT: Yes, sir, if I could, a little bit of history. As I understand
it, going back to the beginning, there was some disagreement or a lack
of understanding on Lockheed's part of what it meant to do TEMPEST and
to have TEMPEST. And, as such, as it was explained to me, it wasn't bid,
or at least not entirely.
Well, at some point, Lockheed realized that they had classified
circuits. As soon as you put these classified circuits on a boat, you
assume TEMPEST. It's part of the deal. It's what happens. So they asked
an internal engineer to go tell them what they needed to do in order to
satisfy those requirements. And keep in mind, this is after the bid had
been accepted and they had already started.
CUMMINGS: So what you're saying is, is that the bid had been accepted.
DE KORT: Yes.
CUMMINGS: The requirements were not online to be met with regard to
TEMPEST?
DE KORT: They literally didn't know what needed to be done.
CUMMINGS: The Coast Guard did not know?
DE KORT: No, no, no, Lockheed.
CUMMINGS: Lockheed.
DE KORT: Lockheed did not know, at the time they asked for that report
internally, exactly what they needed to do to satisfy the TEMPEST
requirements.
CUMMINGS: Now, you just made a very -- that's a very strong statement
you just made. You understand you're talking about Lockheed Martin, do
you not?
DE KORT: Yes, sir, you don't -- I'm sorry.
CUMMINGS: Let me finish. Now, you're talking about an organization that
is known worldwide for producing all kinds of systems in this realm. You
understand that?
DE KORT: Yes, sir. I'm saying they weren't competent.
CUMMINGS: I'm sorry?
DE KORT: I'm saying they weren't competent, and I can explain how they
got to that position.
CUMMINGS: Well, tell me.
DE KORT: And this was explained to me by Mr. Bruce Winterstine who is on
one of the panels. I was actually on the proposal team for three days.
DE KORT: During that period, when I came in, I had asked Mr. Winterstine
how the bid was going to be structured. And he -- they explained to me
that the Morristown group that primarily does Aegis was going to be the
lead group, and that previously to that there had been another group
that was going to be involved or lead out of Egan, Minnesota, where the
C4ISR engineers were.
And they said, well, we'll going to bid it out of Morristown so we can
leverage Aegis, which strategically is a great idea. Aegis is a
fantastic system. I understand why you want to leverage it.
But I told them, I said, "Look, you people are Aegis engineers, OK, and
you have a software background. You need to go back to Egan, Minnesota,
get the C4ISR experts and have them as part of your team."
And I was told, "No, we don't need to do that." And I asked why. And
they said, "Because Aegis is difficult. We've been doing it for 30
years. We know what we're doing. The C4ISR area is easy. We'll figure it
out, no problem. We don't need that other group." OK.
That's literally how it happened. It's a perfect storm, sir.
So when you get into an aggressive bidding situation where you have to
move out fast, you may have underbid and your staff -- and not in all
cases. Let me say here that there are some very dedicated people,
lower-level engineers who worked extremely hard and some who did have
the background required. But there weren't nearly enough of them. OK.
So they literally shut out the C4ISR experts that they had in the
company. Of course, sir, Lockheed Martin is the world's largest defense
contractor. They have over 100,000 employees. They have plenty of
people, sir, who know how to do this well. And I recommended to them
that they go back to Minnesota and get those people, and they said no. I
fought the issue for three days and they removed me from the proposal
team.
CUMMINGS: So basically what you're saying is that the contractor
personnel and the Coast Guard personnel working on the C4ISR system --
you're saying they weren't qualified to understand TEMPEST, TEMPEST
requirements?
DE KORT: I'm saying, sir, that the people who were involved at time,
that were working on the proposal at the time I was there, were not.
What they were doing is, since Aegis is a very large command and control
system, very complicated, large command and system, I believe they were
trying to leverage that expertise.
DE KORT: And the ironic part is, is C4SR in these areas, since it's all
off the shelf, compared to Aegis, is actually much easier to figure out.
There's not a lot of complicated engineering.
However, you still need to know what you're doing.
CUMMINGS: Overall, why do you think the 123s had so much difficulty
achieving TEMPEST certification?
DE KORT: Because when you have 100 cables that are not the right type, I
mean, you run into problems. I mean, TEMPEST can be moderately difficult
on a very small craft because of very tight space constraints. So a lot
of engineering and thought has to be put into how do you co-locate
systems that are red and black. And Mr. Atkinson can explain later.
But basically red and black were classifications for the part of the
system that is clear and unencrypted and the part of the system that is
encrypted and not clear.
Well, it's very difficult to do on a small ship. But to go the extra
degree to not actually purchase the equipment that is very, very basic
to TEMPEST requirements just starts you off at a very bad place.
In DOD and the State Department, sir, everybody used the proper shielded
cable. It was the backbone -- or one of the backbone items that you
always do.
And they didn't do it because of cost.
CUMMINGS: The Department of Homeland Security I.G. indicates that the
contract on the 123, Mr. De Kort, used aluminum mylar shielded cable as
part of the cutter upgrade. The I.G. indicates that these cables met
minimum Deepwater contract requirements for the shielded cable but do
not have the mechanical durability of the braided metallic shielded
cable.
Do you know which type of cable the ICGS TEMPEST requirements document
required?
DE KORT: Again, sir, this is going to get into an area where even -- I
have a TEMPEST background relative to working on cryptographic equipment
and systems, but you're getting into some particulars that are better
left to Mr. Atkinson. But I can say that.
CUMMINGS: Well, let me ask you this. What type of cabling was installed
on the 110s prior to their conversion?
DE KORT: I've been unable to determine that, sir. I was told that they
had the braided, shielded cable. Not only that, but Mr. Braden can tell
you that the braided, shielded cable was used on his effort, not on mine
-- or on the 123s, I should say.
CUMMINGS: Now, you know Mr. Braden?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: And how did you come to know him.
DE KORT: We were both system engineering leads of our respective parts
in the project.
CUMMINGS: So you have worked with him.
DE KORT: There were occasions, sir, that we did. Mostly it was in
program management meetings. We actually didn't work side by side all
the time.
CUMMINGS: OK. Now did you raise the issue of noncompliance of the
topside equipment on the 123s with senior Lockheed management?
DE KORT: All the way to the CEO and the board of directors, sir.
CUMMINGS: All the way up to who?
DE KORT: The board of directors and the CEO of Lockheed Martin. I went
up through my functional chain, the program management chain, the
engineering chains and the ethics chains, all the way up to the CEO and
board of directors.
CUMMINGS: And when you say you went up to the CEO, board of directors,
what do you mean by that? How did you do that?
DE KORT: I sent e-mails to Robert Stevens, at least two of them, and the
board of directors I sent a letter.
CUMMINGS: To the entire board?
DE KORT: Yes. Well, I sent it to a specific individual who I believe was
the ethics officer on the board.
CUMMINGS: Now did you discuss with anyone at Lockheed the need for
noncompliance of the topside equipment with the Deepwater contract
requirements to be noted on the DD250s? If so, what was the outcome of
those discussions?
DE KORT: I was told before the 123s, the first one delivered, the
Matagorda, that every item that I had brought forth would either be
repaired or clearly called out in the DD250s as being a problem. The
first time I actually saw the DD250s or was told what they contained was
recently. And, as I understand, the DD250 for the Matagorda, that item
does not show.
CUMMINGS: Now, why was topside equipment so crucial?
DE KORT: The topside equipment is all the externally-mounted equipment
that supports the C4ISR system. So for the communications systems, it's
everything on the outside on the boat that you would need for the
systems, usually antennas.
But for sensors, like radar, it's the radar antenna, and there's other
equipment up there like amplifiers. And then for other vessels like the
NSC and the FRC, there would be many, many more systems.
Basically, the 123s had communication systems.
DE KORT: They had sensor systems. And they had navigation systems.
So for those systems, if there was anything that those systems required
to operate, that was attached to the outside of the boat.
CUMMINGS: Let me ask you something.
You mentioned a moment ago the word "ethics." You said you -- something
about an ethics complaint or complaints.
Did you file complaints?
DE KORT: There were three separate ethics investigations internal to
Lockheed Martin conducted.
CUMMINGS: And were those with regard to the issues that you just
mentioned here?
DE KORT: Yes, sir, all of them.
CUMMINGS: Could you just tell us in a sentence or two what those were
now?
DE KORT: The external equipment being able to survive the environment,
the blind spots for the cameras, the (inaudible) cables and TEMPEST.
The reason why the non-waterproof radio was not included is because,
like I explained in my statement, they'd actually swapped it out right
before they delivered the Matagorda. So I did not include that in my
ethics statement other than to say, "Look, you know, any group who is
willing to put a non-weatherproof radio on an exposed boat like that --
something's wrong and something needs to be looked into." And especially
when they order more radios after you tell them it's a mistake.
So it was an incidental item.
CUMMINGS: And what happened with regard to those investigations?
DE KORT: The answer for the first one was, literally, "The allegations
all have no merit. They are all baseless and we're not going to tell you
why."
CUMMINGS: And that was the response from the ethics officer?
DE KORT: It was from a John Shelton, who was the ethics investigator for
the Lockheed Martin organization out of Morristown.
And then after that there were two more investigations. Every time they
came back to me and said that my allegations were baseless, I asked who
their boss was.
CUMMINGS: And then you instead tried to go a step higher?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: Now, would Mr. Braden or anybody else here have known of those
-- because you said you work with Mr. Braden. Would he have known about
that? We'll get to them a little later, but...
DE KORT: Would he have known that I necessarily filed an ethics...
CUMMINGS: Right.
DE KORT: Not that I was aware of. No, sir.
CUMMINGS: All right.
Did you see any evidence of Lockheed -- you mentioned a little earlier
something about underbidding.
Is that -- is this a conclusion you came to, or...
DE KORT: Yes, sir. That's subjective on my part.
CUMMINGS: All right.
DE KORT: It's an observation of being in DOD. It's -- it's aggressively
bid. Projects are basically priced to win. And more often than not, they
turn out to be extremely aggressive, which is usually a politically
correct term for underbid.
CUMMINGS: Did anybody at Lockheed ever tell you to just get on with it?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: Is that right?
DE KORT: Well, everybody I talked to. I mean, my manager -- my
functional manager actually told me -- and so did some other people, but
they said, "You know, you're doing the right thing here, but it's going
to come back to bite you."
CUMMINGS: Say that again? I'm sorry.
DE KORT: Several people, including my manager at the time, told me that
I was doing the right thing, but it was going to come back to bite me.
CUMMINGS: So your immediate supervisor?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: He knew you were doing the right thing, he told you.
DE KORT: That's what he told me, sir. Several engineers and program
managers on the effort said the same thing.
CUMMINGS: Now, you said that you left the 123 program. Is that right?
DE KORT: I was removed from the program, yes.
CUMMINGS: And how'd that come about?
DE KORT: Well...
CUMMINGS: And when? And when?
DE KORT: Roughly January of February. I had sent an e-mail or letter,
embedded an e-mail to at the time the acting technical director for the
engineering group saying that I wanted to be removed from the project
because they were going down a road that I just found intolerable.
However, later on I met with the V.P. of the organization, a man named
Carl Banner (ph), and he told me everything would be resolved. And I
said at that point, "Well, then, I would like to recall my letter to be
removed. If you're going to do the right thing, then I want to be part
of the right thing. I want to see this project to conclusion." But after
that they removed me anyway.
CUMMINGS: My last question, Mr. De Kort. You understand that today
you're under oath, do you not?
DE KORT: Yes, sir, I'm completely aware of that.
CUMMINGS: And you know what that means?
DE KORT: It means I should tell you the truth.
CUMMINGS: And that you are telling the truth.
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: And you understand that all kinds of agencies will probably
review this transcript. Some are probably looking at this right now.
DE KORT: I would hope that they do.
CUMMINGS: And would you tell us why you've come forward? They term you a
whistleblower, I guess you know that.
DE KORT: Well, at its essence I did not want a crew to come into harm's
way down the road and to know that I could have done something about it.
It's just that simple.
My background is Navy, State Department, counterterrorism for a while.
I've been in DOD programs since I was 18 years in one capacity or
another. OK? It's just real simple: I couldn't have that on my
conscience.
CUMMINGS: Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette?
LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your testimony.
Mr. De Kort, I made a note during the latter part of your responses to
the chairman that it's your allegation that Lockheed Martin didn't do
the braided, shielded cables, the low-smoke cables, the proper
environmental work on the topside and 360 degree camera radius because
of cost.
LATOURETTE: Is that your observation?
DE KORT: I was told we didn't do the TEMPEST cables, the shielded cables
because of cost. The rest to some degree is an inference. Their response
consistently was, "We're not going to slip the schedule, we're not going
to have more budget issues."
And, to some degree, because there was a relationship with Northrop
Grumman that was extremely contentious at the time -- I now refer to it
as playing chicken -- they didn't want to fix the issues for any one or
all of those reasons.
LATOURETTE: But I guess my question is this: My understanding -- and we
can quibble about the exact value of the contract, but this about a $90
million contract to convert these eight boats from 110s to 123s. And not
being in the boat business, I would think that the big chunk of change
was probably in extended the hulls by -- that's not where the big money
is?
DE KORT: I've been told that the C4ISR proportionally was a larger part
of the budget. I could be wrong, but...
LATOURETTE: And so let me get to that. Is it your understanding that low
smoke cables were called for in the Deepwater contract that Lockheed
Martin bid for?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
LATOURETTE: But they were not installed.
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
LATOURETTE: And is it your understanding that they weren't installed
because low smoke cables cost more than the cables that were installed?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
LATOURETTE: And that the same with the braided, shielded cables?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
LATOURETTE: And the weatherization or making sure that the antenna on
the topside is the same as that?
DE KORT: It's more supposition because there wasn't -- I don't know
which one of those four issues was the overbearing reason for the
environmental issue. What I'm saying is, is in the others, somebody told
me specifically cost. In that one, it was any one of the four or all
four reasons.
LATOURETTE: OK, so just so I'm clear, it's your testimony and allegation
that the reason that Lockheed Martin didn't comply with the
specifications that were in the Deepwater contract is because they
wanted to install cheaper stuff?
DE KORT: Yes, sir. That is part of it, yes.
LATOURETTE: OK, and you understand that they say that's not so, right?
And so we're going to be stuck with a problem here sooner or later.
DE KORT: Well, objectively, sir...
LATOURETTE: Yes.
DE KORT: ... if you look at the equipment that they wound up delivering
and the equipment that I wanted them to delivery, the equipment that I
wanted them to deliver, in every case, is more expensive.
LATOURETTE: OK.
DE KORT: So I don't think it's a leap.
LATOURETTE: OK. But I guess I'm trying to get expensive -- they put some
cables in, and you're saying that the cables that the contract called
for were more expensive. Are we talking on the scale of millions of
dollars?
DE KORT: For the external equipment, over -- understand, sir, because
it's system to systems, they were leveraging designs.
LATOURETTE: Right.
DE KORT: So if very well could be millions of dollars if the -- you
know, the 123 was establishing the pattern so all the rest of the
systems, they were contractually directed to make them common.
DE KORT: So, while it appears like a small issue for the 123s,
understand that it was 49 123s and every other boat that they delivered.
So it is millions of dollars spread out, yes, sir.
LATOURETTE: OK.
Mr. Atkinson, to you, one I want to thank you for your testimony and
your charts because you truly did make the TEMPEST system understandable
by people as dumb as I am. And I appreciate that. I now have an
understanding. And I thought that your explanation was a good one.
But to you, how did you get involved in this project to the point where
you wrote us 128 or 138 pages of stuff?
ATKINSON: Sir, I was contacted by the committee and asked to provide
expert guidance as to how to query properly the Coast Guard and Lockheed
Martin, because the documents which had been produced to date -- this is
dating a month ago -- were not answering the questions that the
committee needed answers.
And I was asked to assist the committee in demanding from the Coast
Guard the relevant documents which the Department of Homeland Security
OIG had failed to pick up on. TEMPEST is a very tricky matter. It's very
easy for a defense contractor to ignore it. It's also very easy for them
to conceal their ignorance of it, or their ignoring of it.
And I was engaged by this committee. I've donated my time to this
committee to assist this committee in finding the truth and by helping
the committee identify the documents that the committee needed to
conduct its business.
LATOURETTE: Good. And I appreciate that. And I think everybody on the
committee appreciates your willingness to donate and volunteer your
time.
And I found the questions in your amendments to be -- I assume those are
the questions you're talking about that people need to ask to get the
answers that you think need to be answered?
ATKINSON: Yes, sir.
This committee needs to ask all of those questions on the responsible
players.
LATOURETTE: OK.
Which brings me to the next part of my question, and that is the
observations that you make in the first 36 or odd pages of your
testimony relative to the TEMPEST tests that were performed and how they
were performed, how they weren't performed properly and things of that
nature.
But that comes about as not from an inspection of the systems on the
123. That comes about as a result of your examination of the documents
that were obtained from the Coast Guard?
ATKINSON: Yes, sir.
I advised the committee on what documents to demand from the Coast
Guard. The Coast Guard provided some of the documents, albeit
reluctantly, to this committee. I examined those documents. I found
significant inconsistencies in those documents, which I brought to this
committee's attention in the form of my written report.
LATOURETTE: Right. And I saw that.
But I guess my question to you is -- and I don't know what people on the
next panels are going to testify, but we have three more panels of
people including the Coast Guard and people from the Navy and so forth
and so on.
Is there -- based upon your field of study, your expertise, what you do
for a living -- if people come forward and testify under oath that in
fact the TEMPEST tests were performed properly, and that this system
passed, is there any way in your opinion that they could give such an
answer?
ATKINSON: Could I get you to repeat the question, sir?
LATOURETTE: No, I don't remember the question.
(LAUGHTER)
The question is that, as I read your testimony, you came to a conclusion
that there's no -- not no way -- but that this system wasn't properly
tested.
LATOURETTE: And you go to great lengths to tell us that. I don't know
who's coming next -- I know who's coming next. I don't know what they're
going to say until they say it, but based upon the documents that you
reviewed, is there any way that you believe someone could sit before
this committee and say that this system -- these systems that were
installed in the eight 123s -- could pass the TEMPEST testing system?
ATKINSON: I will make the answer very straightforward. If anybody comes
before this committee and indicates that these ships protect national
defense information, they are committing perjury.
LATOURETTE: OK, and that is a very straightforward answer, but let me --
not to be lawyerly with you, but since I don't know the TEMPEST tests
the way that you do -- and you went to great lengths to talk about how
it's appropriate or proper to make the tests of the TEMPEST system.
I'm saying is that there -- if we have somebody that comes and says,
"You know what? I tested this TEMPEST system and it meets the standard
in the industry, the standard in the military," whatever the standard
is, can a person make such a claim based upon the knowledge that you
have today?
ATKINSON: No, sir. All of the documents that were provided to the
committee stated, in the Coast Guard's own documents, that they failed
the TEMPEST inspections and instead of correcting the deficiencies, they
either ignored the deficiencies or they issued waivers to cover the
deficiencies up.
LATOURETTE: Right.
And, Mr. Braden, to you, based upon -- you've installed TEMPEST systems
in other programs, have you?
BRADEN: Yes. On the 270-foot cutters, the legacy cutters and also the
design for the 210s and the 383s.
LATOURETTE: OK, and to Mr. De Kort's observation, did you, in the
installation of those systems, have a specification that called for
these braided and shielded cables?
BRADEN: The specification is actually a standard -- a TEMPEST standard.
And as was mentioned before, I initially relied on a report from a Ms.
Joe Agat (ph), who was asked to put together a list of criteria, if you
will, for how a TEMPEST installation was to be done.
The reason that I met with her to go over that document, although it was
listed as a document for the 123s, is that some years ago, I was product
manager for a line of TEMPEST terminals sold to several national
security agencies.
And, as a result, I was familiar with TEMPEST requirements in a very
detailed fashion at that time. A number of years went by and I wanted to
make sure that the requirements had not changed.
LATOURETTE: And the requirement is braided, shielded cables?
BRADEN: The requirement consists of recommendations. In some cases,
those recommendations give alternatives. Braided, shielded cable is the
preferred alternative for ensuring security with the cabling?
LATOURETTE: Are you familiar with the cables that were installed on the
123 conversions?
BRADEN: No.
LATOURETTE: OK.
Do you know what they're called, Mr. De Kort? Is it like a...
DE KORT: The aluminum mylar cables.
LATOURETTE: Aluminum mylar?
DE KORT: Yes, sir.
Mr. Braden, is an aluminum mylar cable one of the alternatives that you
had? Do you know?
BRADEN: It could be an alternative as long as it was confirmed that the
aluminum mylar was properly shielded and that it gave a full coverage
under all conditions. And, as was already mentioned, aluminum mylar is
not recommended because of durability issues, so it would be more
appropriate in internal compartments or places where movement isn't
used.
LATOURETTE: And let me ask you this and do you know anything about what
the different is, and how much 100 feet of braided, shielded cable costs
as opposed to how much the mylar aluminum cable costs?
BRADEN: No, I couldn't say what the price difference is. It certainly is
more expensive, but I think the key issue is that it's much harder to
get schedule-wise.
LATOURETTE: It's harder to get because of the manufacturer?
BRADEN: From a schedule standpoint, it is no the common, ordinary cable
that you can buy at CompUSA.
LATOURETTE: Right. But you could buy mylar aluminum cables?
BRADEN: Oh, absolutely, at almost any outlet.
LATOURETTE: You worked for Lockheed Martin for 30 years?
BRADEN: Yes.
LATOURETTE: Have you experienced a situation where the company has made
a determination on cable that has the ability to be detrimental to
national security just based on how much it costs?
BRADEN: I've never seen that before.
LATOURETTE: And what about scheduling?
BRADEN: I've seen a lot of pressure on schedule on many programs.
LATOURETTE: Well, I'm sure you've seen pressures, but where a decision
was made -- I mean, the allegation that Mr. De Kort I think is making,
his testimony is that part of it was cost and part of it was not wanting
to get behind schedule. They were going to get behind schedule on this
stuff. Have you experienced the same experiences that Mr. De Kort has
testified to in any of the work that you've done for the Coast Guard?
BRADEN: On the Deepwater program, I did experience intense pressure on
both schedule and cost. As I stated in my opening statement, my project
was a fixed-price contract and so there was a fair amount of scrutiny on
every issue associated with cost.
LATOURETTE: And, last question, not to be lawyerly with you, but did
that pressure on cost and schedule cause you or others that you work
with to do something that you knew violated either the specs or created
a situation on the TEMPEST system that was likely, as Mr. Atkinson has
testified, to be vulnerable to leaking national secrets?
BRADEN: I didn't allow that to happen. I had a bit more oversight of my
program than Mr. De Kort did, a little more independence in
decision-making. And, as a result, we implemented our system totally
correctly.
LATOURETTE: Were you ever asked to do what Mr. De Kort says he was asked
to do?
BRADEN: No.
LATOURETTE: OK, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
CUMMINGS: Thank you very much.
As we go to Mr. Oberstar, let me just -- in fairness to Lockheed Martin
and to the contract team, Mr. Atkinson, you said in the answer to a
question about if someone were to say that TEMPEST certification was
done here, with these votes, that they would be committing perjury. Is
that what you said?
ATKINSON: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: Could it be that maybe they just didn't know?
I just want to be fair.
ATKINSON: Well, let me be very precise on this. In the delivery task
order that the Coast Guard issued to purchase these ships, they listed
only one TEMPEST specification -- one. There's a book roughly that
thick.
It is called "Mil Handbook 232A, Red/Black Engineering." I have a copy
in front of me. That was the only document that the United States Coast
Guard provided to Lockheed Martin as part of the delivery order.
The United States Coast Guard did not ask for TEMPEST ships. They did
not ask for these ships to pass classified information. I have it right
in front of me, documents which this committee has in their possession,
that irrefutably show these ships would not have complied with TEMPEST
when they were delivered from the contract the Coast Guard gave Lockheed
Martin.
CUMMINGS: All right, thank you.
Mr. Oberstar?
OBERSTAR: Mr. Braden, you knew Mr. De Kort during the Deepwater program?
BRADEN: Yes, I did.
OBERSTAR: Were you aware of the problems Mr. De Kort raised with 123s?
And how did you come to know about those problems?
BRADEN: Well, I was aware of them because of the weekly integration team
meetings that we had. Many of the issues on all the assets were
discussed openly and presentations were given by the various lead
members, and we would hear issues that were trying to be resolved across
the entire program.
OBERSTAR: Did you discuss at length the issue of non-low smoke cabling,
cameras that did not provide 360-degree coverage, problems with TEMPEST
hardware?
And for the record, Mr. Chairman, we've been using this term, but it's
telecom electronics material protected from emanating spurious
transmissions.
We may have said that earlier, but I think we need to get that on the
record, because it's a term frequently used and it has a very ominous
sound to it.
And non-weatherproof topside equipment, did you discuss those matters?
BRADEN: I had occasion to speak on a couple of those matters with Mr. De
Kort and that was as a result of an integration team meeting we had
where I had presented the approach that we were using for the legacy
cutters for our certification and accreditation.
I was approached after that meeting by Mr. De Kort, who quizzed me on
what we were doing on those issues. We did not talk about the radios or
environmental issues. We primarily talked about cabling. And TEMPEST
issues was the nature of the conversation, and I related to him what we
were doing on my cutters.
OBERSTAR: Are you aware of the cabling issue on aircraft in the 1980s
and '90s where chaffing occurred in the bundles of cables on aircraft?
BRADEN: Yes, I've read about it.
OBERSTAR: Commercial, I'm talking about the commercial aircraft.
BRADEN: Yes.
OBERSTAR: You're aware of that.
BRADEN: Yes.
OBERSTAR: And it was similar, mylar aluminum, non-shielded cable.
Chaffing that occurred inside aircraft resulted in wearing away of the
shield, the protective mylar covering, that then resulted in sparking,
with surge of very low voltage through those wires that then caused fire
and caused aircraft damage and failure.
Are you aware of all that?
BRADEN: Yes. Yes, I am.
OBERSTAR: So you understand what the Coast Guard is doing or was doing
in this case when they did not install the proper cabling, right?
BRADEN: I believe that the analogy you gave is appropriate in a
hazardous situation. In the implementation of network cabling, in, at
least for the assets that I was responsible for, all that cabling was
routed through the nine areas where no hazard would occur if the cable
had been chaffed. But I do understand your point.
OBERSTAR: But making a leap from the hazard to a different kind of
hazard of leakage of signal, that's the real issue here.
BRADEN: Yes, I believe so.
OBERSTAR: And you knew about Mr. De Kort raising his concerns to
Lockheed.
BRADEN: Well, I learned about them through his "You Tube" video, which
was widely viewed by many employees, and that's where I first learned of
his allegations.
OBERSTAR: So you said that your program, the upgrade of the 270- foot
cutters, was successful.
BRADEN: Yes.
OBERSTAR: What cabling did you install there?
BRADEN: We installed shielded, braided cable. In some instances, we
installed fiber optic cable, in instances where we went from secure
compartments to compartments, and we armor jacketed that cable to
prevent intrusion in non-secured locations on the ship. And we also
specified low smoke, zero-allergen jackets on all the cabling.
OBERSTAR: And why were you able to install the more TEMPEST standard
cabling on the 270 legacy cutters?
BRADEN: I can't say explicitly why that was, but I can say that the
attention of most of the program and the management staff was attending
to the 123 in terms of its schedule difficulties and, more or less, I
guess I was left alone to do it right.
OBERSTAR: Well, why would the more secure cabling go into one class of
vessel and not on the other?
BRADEN: I really can't answer that question. I don't know why that would
be.
OBERSTAR: But you knew it was happening, and you saw the dangers.
BRADEN: Well, I had heard that it had -- it was one of the items that
had been raised, but I think, as Mr. De Kort has stated, during the
course of any project, there are problems. These problems are usually
mitigated or removed as the course of the program goes on.
And my team was very, very busy meeting our aggressive schedule. I did
not have time to go investigate personally whether anyone had taken
action on these or not.
OBERSTAR: Were you asked to use aluminum mylar cable? And if you had
been, would you have used it on the 270s?
BRADEN: Where appropriate, I would have used it, yes.
OBERSTAR: Now, I want to come to the testing. There are visual tests and
instrument tests. And did the 270 cutters pass the visual and then
subsequently the instrument test?
BRADEN: We passed the visual on the second cutter. The first cutter we
retrofit. And the reason for that is that the cabling that we had
ordered for the fiber optic connections and some of the other
connections was a custom cable that was being manufactured for us by a
firm in Virginia.
There was a hurricane that hit and pulled the roof off of that factory.
That caused delays in that cable.
With the total agreement of the Coast Guard, we went ahead with the
first installation and planned to retrofit it with the higher quality
cable at a later date, which was subsequently done.
The visual inspection noted those discrepancies. They accepted them on
the interim authority to operate. And we did replace that cable.
On the second cutter, we fully passed all visual inspections and then
all subsequent...
OBERSTAR: And then subsequent, should be the instrument...
BRADEN: Yes.
OBERSTAR: ... inspection and testing.
BRADEN: Yes. And I left the program before that instrumented test had
been performed on the first cutter.
OBERSTAR: Now, the I.G. at the Department of Homeland Security has
confirmed that the contractor failed to install non-low smoke cabling
and failed to install topside equipment that would function in all
weather conditions.
How could that have happened?
BRADEN: I really can't explain how that would have taken place.
OBERSTAR: Did you raise your concerns about the cable installation with
Lockheed management?
BRADEN: I had discussed with our technical director some of the issues
that had come up in the reviews regarding the 123 and I discussed them
with them only in the sense that I was expressing my concern that they
really needed to deal with them so that we wouldn't keep talking about
them.
OBERSTAR: Did you feel that this rose to the level of an ethics question
and did you file an ethics investigation?
BRADEN: I didn't feel it did at that time, no. I subsequently did file
an ethics investigation concern at a later date.
OBERSTAR: And to whom or to which level did you file that?
BRADEN: The ethics office at Lockheed Martin Morristown.
OBERSTAR: And what action was taken subsequent to the filing of that?
BRADEN: I received no response.
OBERSTAR: Nothing.
BRADEN: Nothing.
OBERSTAR: Do you know any outcome or any action taken later?
BRADEN: Only supposition on my part. One of the concerns I had had to do
with an employee morale program that had not been followed through with
and I suggested that the ethics officer might want to contact our H.R.
department to reinstate the employee award program. And about one month
after that, the award program was reinstated.
Now, I don't know whether that was as a result of my conversation or
just a normal course of...
OBERSTAR: To the best of your knowledge, that's the only follow- up that
occurred?
BRADEN: That's the best guess I have, and that's it.
OBERSTAR: I'll have further questions later. Thank you very much.
CUMMINGS: Mr. LoBiondo?
LOBIONDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I think it's absolutely
imperative that we try to get to the bottom of the situation.
I'm hoping that we're going to hear something about the buckling hulls,
and I may ask that in a couple of minutes, but I wanted to say that
while I think this hearing today is very important, I think it's equally
important that we not lose sight of the fact that the Coast Guard
currently operates the second oldest fleet of vessels and aircraft in
the world, and that was the purpose of Operation Deepwater.
Some of these assets are over 60 years old. They're rapidly failing.
Operations tempo continues to increase. Service-wide readiness is down.
Hundreds of patrol days are being lost annually.
And probably most importantly, the safety of the men and women of the
Coast Guard who operate these assets are more in danger, I think, every
day.
The success of the Coast Guard's many vital missions I think are in
serious jeopardy.
As we move through this, I just hope that we can keep in sight that it
is critically important that the service get these aging assets replaced
with fully functioning and capable assets, and as soon as possible.
I would hope that we remember the videos of the Gulf hurricanes of
Katrina and Rita, and the job that the Coast Guard did. And however
miserably the federal government failed, no one faulted the Coast Guard.
And part of the ability of the Coast Guard to perform so admirably at
that time was the result of the Deepwater program and the upgrade of
some of the helicopters that had incredible lift capability and
thousands upon thousands of lives were saved in that whole process.
I'm very pleased with Admiral Allen's decision yesterday. I think it was
very proactive. I think it will help rein in control of this program.
And it's a serious situation that needs to be fixed.
I have a lot of confidence in Admiral Allen. I have a very serious
regret that Admiral Allen did not get his hands on the helm sooner than
when he did. I'll leave it at that.
I would say to my colleagues that I know this situation makes it pretty
easy for us to throw our hands up and to walk away from Deepwater and
say that it's fatally flawed and it's got to be scrapped, but I plead
with you not to turn your back on the men and women of the Coast Guard,
those young men and women who are heroes every day, who are putting
their lives on the line for us in so many different ways and are
depending on us to come up with a solution that meets the challenges or
the problems we're hearing about today, but still finds a way to give
them the replacement of the assets.
The safety and success of their missions depend on the replacement of
these assets. And it's our job to make sure that we do the best
possible.
So, Mr. Chairman, I once again commend you and Mr. Oberstar for really
getting at the heart of this problem and I hope we can get to a point
where we can move forward.
I thank you very much. And I will later on try to ask some questions
about the buckling of the hulls, when that's an appropriate time.
CUMMINGS: That will be good when we have the Coast Guard up.
Let me just say, Mr. LoBiondo, there's not one syllable, not one
syllable, that you just stated that I disagree with. We all are trying
to get -- make sure that the Coast Guard has equipment so that they can
do the great job like they did down at Katrina and the things that they
do every day, the largest seizure that they've ever had in their history
just recently taking place.
And so this is all a part of making sure -- and I agree with you that we
want them to have that equipment, but we want that equipment to be safe,
and we want it to be safe for our personnel.
And, again, as I said a little earlier, we just want ships that float,
planes that fly, just want what we contracted for.
Before we get to Mr. DeFazio, I just have one quick question.
Mr. Braden, just in follow-up to Chairman Oberstar's question, you said
that -- he asked you about whether you had been asked to use -- he asked
you whether you would use aluminum mylar shielded cable, and you said in
certain instances.
Is that correct?
BRADEN: Yes.
CUMMINGS: Let me ask you these. Would you have used them in secure
situations where we were trying to make sure that there was no
eavesdropping, the very thing that Mr. De Kort complained about? I think
that's the question.
If you had been asked to use that kind of cabling under the
circumstances that Mr. De Kort complained about, would you have used it?
BRADEN: That's a difficult question to answer because the application of
the cabling is also dependent on the type of compartment that you
install it in and whether it's a totally shielded and contained and
properly grounded compartment.
And what I mean by that, and I'm sure Mr. Atkinson can lend more detail
to this, if I have a piece of equipment that is totally contained within
a shielded enclosure and it's sharing that enclosure with other
equipment of its same classification level and the same network
connection, connectivity, then if that cable is properly grounded,
shielded, then, yes, the mylar cable would be acceptable in that
instance.
CUMMINGS: I see you shaking your head, Mr. Atkinson.
ATKINSON: Yes, sir. If you build a cabinet that contains classified
equipment and the cabinet itself is TEMPEST certified, you can take an
uncertified piece of equipment, put it inside this cabinet and it will
provide some level of protection.
A very common thing is to take a printer or a plotter or a certain type
of computer that there is no TEMPEST equivalent of and to encapsulate it
inside of a TEMPEST box or a TEMPEST shield, which now renders it
protected.
We can do the same thing with cables, where we can use a non- TEMPEST
involved cable to hook up something that is put into a box which is
itself protected.
And we had to be very careful what we put into this box, because some
things we put in this box will cause TEMPEST hazards to occur.
CUMMINGS: From all the records that you've read, would you agree with
Mr. De Kort?
ATKINSON: In what regard?
CUMMINGS: With regard to his complaints about the aluminum mylar
shielded cable and that it should not have been used?
ATKINSON: Yes, sir. I have actually researched the cable that he's
referring to and have found Coast Guard records in regards to them and
have identified that we're talking a difference of about $20 for the
cable.
CUMMINGS: Mr. DeFazio?
OBERSTAR: Would the gentleman yield before...
DEFAZIO: I would certainly yield.
OBERSTAR: I just want to reassure the gentleman from New Jersey, who has
served us for a long time as the chair of the Coast Guard Subcommittee,
that our purpose here is not a public hanging.
We're here to try to fix the underlying problems of the Coast Guard's
management, of its contractual responsibilities to deliver on the
program that the gentleman played a large part in authorizing for the
Coast Guard, just as we have done over many years, and when I chaired
the Aviation Subcommittee and the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee, to get FAA on the right track, learn how to manage
multi-billion dollar contracts and then fund those programs.
I assure the gentleman that is the purpose of this hearing, is to go to
the core of the problems uncovered here, fix them and then report out a
robust Coast Guard authorization program so they can fix those old ships
and have the equipment they need to carry out the many responsibilities
we've loaded upon them.
I yield.
LOBIONDO: Through the chairman, would the gentleman yield for
reauthorization minute?
Mr. Oberstar, I applaud your efforts. I in no way meant to intimate that
that was the case.
But my concern was from some other colleagues who were not on the
committee who have just, in casual conversation, said to me, "We ought
to just scrap the program." And I don't think they understand what
scrapping the program would mean.
OBERSTAR: I just want to reassure the gentleman we are on the same...
LOBIONDO: OK. We're in synchronization. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.
DEFAZIO: And I would certainly second those comments. Ten years ago, as
the ranking member on the Coast Guard subcommittee, I became very well
aware of and was a strong advocate for increased funding and new
equipment for the Coast Guard. I had one of the antique ships in the
Coast Guard serving my district for a while, and I'm well aware of that
problem.
But it was only after 9/11 that Congress and this administration began
to recognize the need.
And Katrina certainly highlighted the efficiency and valor of the Coast
Guard. And none of that's in question here today. But there are
extraordinary questions about how we got to this point.
And I guess I'm going to direct most of my questions to Mr. Sampson. And
I will be questioning the buckling and the design on the 123s, which the
former chairman hoped we'd get to. I've been waiting to get to it, too.
I'm not much of an electronics guy, but I am and have been a lifelong
sailor and boat owner.
Mr. Sampson, these will be directed to you, but just keep this in mind
as I ask you the questions. This is a statement that will come after you
have left and I want to give you an opportunity to sort of respond to it
in your responses to me.
Mr. James Anton, vice president, Deepwater Program, Northrop Grumman
Ship Systems, and if you look at page two of his testimony, he says,
"HBJV added a 13-foot extension to the 110, which was similar to the
9-foot extension they had successfully added to the Cyclone patrol boats
starting in 2000." Note, no mention there of the early problems with
those extensions, but he does say they were successful.
He goes on further on that page to talk about hull deterioration. He
goes on, page three, to talk about the ships being operated in seas
beyond their design capacity.
He goes on, on page four, to say that an outside engineering forum,
designers and planners engaged by the Coast Guard, analysis showed the
overall hull structure design was adequate under all expected operating
conditions up to the worst operating condition modeled.
And then, in summary, he says, "It's premature to speculate on the final
cost and final way forward."
I assume you probably don't agree too much with that analysis or those
remarks.
SAMPSON: No, sir, I don't. There's several different perspectives that
I'd like to address. I haven't had the opportunity to read the comment
that you're discussing.
I wrote down some quick notes. So if there's something there that I
missed, please remind me and I'll feel free to discuss.
In regards to the Navy's experience with the PCs, I want to make sure
it's very clear. CCD Combatant Craft emphasized to the Coast Guard, as
well as Bollinger Shipyard, because this was kind of a misconception
among many, that Bollinger Shipyard built the 110, they built the 170,
they did the extension.
What never appears to come to the surface is the fact that Combatant
Craft Division was the one that did the entire design work for the
extension. The failures that occurred were actually prior to when the
170s were first built. When the PCs were first delivered, they started
failing immediately.
That was a function of -- after extensive investigation, Combatant Craft
came to the position that the 1997 ABS rules, high- speed craft rules
which the PCs were built to, had under-predicted what they call a
dynamic loading condition.
The ABS later, in their high-speed naval craft code, did correct this
based on that experience. It was a known issue to ABS, to Combatant
Craft, and we made that very clear to Bollinger Shipyard.
DEFAZIO: Is that what you discussed with Mr. Debu Ghosh on 9/3/02?
SAMPSON: That was one of the topics, yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: OK, go ahead.
SAMPSON: The Combatant Craft, when they did the design work, Bollinger
is a great fabricator. However, they did not facilitate the engineering,
production detail, things of that nature, but the actual first extension
was not performed by Bollinger, to my understanding. It was actually by
another shipyard.
So they did not perform the engineering. That expertise resided with
CCD. During that 9/3 meeting with Mr. Ghosh, we emphasized to him that
this was not a simple evolution, that the design was very complex. The
PC went from a 5 percent length increase of nine feet as compared to the
123 or the 110, which added 13 feet, to 12 percent increase. This is a
substantial, substantial increase in length.
As a result of that, the rules that were being used or we were told were
being used for the 110 and 123 conversion were these what CCD felt were
flawed rules of ABS, the 1997 high-speed craft code.
DEFAZIO: So that was probably the point at which -- that you, the Navy,
CCD offered to provide some design and engineering support to Bollinger,
Northrop Grumman or the Coast Guard on the conversion.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir. Let me make it clear. CCD did not go out and
necessarily try -- Combatant Craft is a capital funded program. So in
essence, we're like a contractor. We have to go out and sell our
services.
DEFAZIO: Right.
SAMPSON: So I can't voluntarily.
DEFAZIO: But you made an offer that...
SAMPSON: We informed the parties involved, yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: And I believe it was not particularly spendy in terms of how
much money's been wasted here. What would the cost have been?
SAMPSON: Just for oversight to determine if a problem existed would have
been $42,000.
DEFAZIO: $42,000.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: And how much did we spend per ship conversion?
SAMPSON: A lot more than that, sir. I'm not aware of the exact number.
DEFAZIO: OK. But that offer was declined.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: OK. And was there any particular reason given for declining
that offer?
SAMPSON: No, sir.
DEFAZIO: OK. Then you went to the Coast Guard.
SAMPSON: The order that we talked, we had talked with Mr. Ghosh first.
DEFAZIO: Right.
SAMPSON: Then I had talked to the Deepwater program office up in
Washington, D.C., talked to Ms. Diane Burton and another gentleman that,
for the life of me, I can't remember his name, but I remember him as a
program manager. I don't recall if he was specific to the 123 or in
total.
Explained the situation to them. Ms. Burton, being a former NAVSEA
employee, I think understood some of our concerns. However, the
discussion was very short and thank you very much, and we never heard
anything further from them.
Northrop Grumman, Combatant Craft did not contact directly. However,
Bill Moss, who is our point of contact for the Cardarock division, did
provide a capabilities brief to Northrop Grumman to explain what the
Navy had to offer them specific to the 123. Nothing was mentioned.
DEFAZIO: So do you think that there's any possibility that Mr. Anton,
who raises the other issues, was aware of these concerns as a Northrop
Grumman executive?
SAMPSON: I have no idea, sir.
DEFAZIO: Perhaps he'll be asked that on the next panel under oath and
why action wasn't taken.
've got to jump ahead here because the time is valuable and we've been
holding people a long time.
This is, I think, a critical question because there was some concern
raised earlier by Mr. Mica that we're just plowing old ground and that,
in fact, this has all come out before.
But did Mr. Carl Cassamassina (ph) of Navy CCD warn the Coast Guard that
it was in danger of losing a ship if the hull cracking problem was not
corrected?
SAMPSON: I don't have firsthand knowledge of that specific conversation
where those words were used. I do, however, know that Mr. Cassamassina
(ph) and myself talked at length to the Coast Guard and Bollinger and
explained the severity of the situation, and we felt confident that they
understood that.
DEFAZIO: That apparently was -- the Navy did give us that statement,
that they afforded that warning, but I thought you had knowledge of it.
You had conversations...
SAMPSON: Not that particular phone call.
DEFAZIO: ... similar to that with Mr. Cassamassina (ph).
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: So the risk here was catastrophic failure, hull failure, loss
of the ship, potentially loss of life.
SAMPSON: Potentially, yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: And then, finally, it's our understanding the Coast Guard made
two efforts to fix the 123s after the problems with the deck -- that the
decks appeared. Did the Coast Guard consult with CCD on these proposed
fixes, that you're aware of?
SAMPSON: I, as employed by the Coast Guard, did consult with CCD, but
purely on a professional peer level.
DEFAZIO: Right.
SAMPSON: Having worked with them, I consulted them and asked them their
thoughts or to confirm what I was suspecting or believing, which they
provided to me as a personal interest that, yes, these fixes were not
going to work.
SAMPSON: However, there was no direct involvement, to my knowledge,
between CCD and...
DEFAZIO: Did you report that up the chain that these proposed fixes were
not likely to work, according to your consultation with CCD?
SAMPSON: Absolutely. My command, the Maintenance and Logistics Command
Atlantic, voiced those concerns repeatedly.
DEFAZIO: But they went ahead anyway.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
DEFAZIO: And they didn't work.
SAMPSON: Correct.
DEFAZIO: Well, so none of the efforts to fix the 123s succeeded. And
would you then think that -- you would disagree with Mr. Anton's
statement that it's premature to speculate on the final cause and the
way forward -- of the failure.
You think we know the cause.
SAMPSON: I think there's a strong case to be made that the cause is due
to the hull strength of the hull girder issue.
The localized failures that have occurred on deck and some other places
were, in my opinion, a result of the modifications, where they just
moved stress from one location to another.
The actual initial failure of the Matagorda was a clear classical
failure due to bending.
DEFAZIO: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the generous grant of
time and for your leadership on this issue.
I do want to say, in closing, that Mr. De Kort, in his testimony, said
that -- and he was referring to a number of things here -- that these
were actually informed and deliberate acts.
And I hope if, through our investigation, we find that any of these acts
were informed and deliberate, that both defrauded the taxpayers and
jeopardized national security and potentially jeopardized health and
safety of our Coast Guard crews, that we will be providing all of that
to the Justice Department in the hope that maybe some of those
responsible could enjoy federal hospitality.
CUMMINGS: Thank you very much.
I take it, Mr. Sampson, that you did not believe -- I've seen the ships.
I saw them last Thursday and I can tell you they're a mess.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: Have you seen them?
SAMPSON: Yes, sir. I've done extensive investigations and inspections on
those craft.
CUMMINGS: And the amazing thing is that I thought we were talking about
a big ship. Some of these boats are not as big as some yachts.
SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
CUMMINGS: I mean, it's incredible. And it so happened to be in
Baltimore, where I live, it so happened to be there, and I wanted to go
see them. But anyway.
Mr. Gilchrest?
GILCHREST: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to make sure that that Coasty who is today similar to Gene
Taylor 30 years ago, whether they're breaking ice to McMurdo -- maybe 10
years, I don't know when Gene Taylor was in the Coast Guard.
When those Coastys are breaking ice to McMurdo Station in the Antarctic,
on that ship, when they're at Cape Disappointment rescuing people, when
they're in the Gulf of Alaska because a crab boat is in trouble, or the
Chesapeake Bay, or these guys are out there determining international
standards at the IMO in London, it's an extraordinary service.
But I do remember a time 40 years ago when I was using an M-14 in
Vietnam, worked every time we pulled the trigger. Sadly, we had to pull
the trigger occa